Essays on the Political Economy of Crisis and Reform by Brumm, Elias Franziskus
Essays on the Political Economy
of Crisis and Reform
Dissertation submitted to the
Hertie School of Governance
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.)
in the Doctoral Programme in Governance
Elias Franziskus Brumm
Berlin, February 2018
Doctoral Committee
First Adviser and Reviewer:
Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein
Professor of Political Economy, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin
Director, Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin
Second Adviser and Reviewer:
Prof. Benny Geys, PhD
Professor of Economics, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo
Research Professor, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), Brussels
Third Adviser:
Prof. Dr. Christoph Trebesch
Professor of Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Kiel University
Head of the Research Area ‘Global Macroeconomics’, Kiel Institute for the
World Economy
Summary
The severe political and economic repercussions of the ‘euro crisis’ during the last
decade have revealed the necessity for an improved understanding of both the de-
terminants of sovereign debt crises and the political economy of structural reforms.
This dissertation, which consists of three self-contained papers, contributes to these
research areas.
In the first paper, we investigate the interaction of fiscal federalism and sovereign
default risk. Numerous countries with chronic external debt problems are charac-
terized by inefficient federal fiscal structures. However, the impact of a country’s
federal design on sovereign default risk has barely been studied in previous work.
This paper aims to address this gap. We develop a stylized model of a federation
in which regions borrow individually from international lenders while the central
government decides whether to default on aggregate sovereign debt. We show
that decentralized borrowing leads to higher debt levels, at higher bond yields, an
increased default probability and lower welfare compared to a benchmark scenario
of centralized borrowing. Moreover, differing regional default costs further increase
aggregate welfare losses through distorted regional borrowing incentives. Case
studies of Argentina and the euro area illustrate the channels described in the
model.
The second paper analyzes how domestic distributional incentives influence
sovereign default on debt held by foreign creditors. In a simple political economy
model, we show that external default can serve as a redistributive policy similar to
distortionary income taxation. The channel we derive builds on recent evidence
which suggests that the output costs of default are mainly incurred by high-income
households, whereas relatively poor ones benefit due to smaller public spending
I
cuts. Although the potentially important role of income heterogeneity among
domestic agents has attracted comparatively little attention in previous work, his-
torical evidence is in line with our argument.
In the third paper (with Johannes Brumm, published in Economic Inquiry), we
argue that an important determinant of voters’ support for economic reform is the
strength of family ties. While the ‘crisis hypothesis’ predicts that crises facilitate
reform, we show in a political economy model that this relation can break down,
and even reverse, when agents take into account the effect of reform on their family
members. Applied to southern European countries with strong family ties, the
model rationalizes why the extremely high (youth) unemployment following the
Great Recession has not led to more substantial labor market reforms. In such
countries austerity might block rather than foster additional structural reforms.
II
To my parents
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisers whose invaluable guidance
made the completion of this dissertation possible. Henrik Enderlein sparked my
interest in the sovereign debt literature, supported me throughout the entire project
and allowed me to follow my own ideas. I am very grateful to Benny Geys. By
striking the perfect balance between identifying the weaknesses of my research,
suggesting improvements and finding encouraging words, Benny’s excellent feed-
back was essential for the progress of my work. I thank Christoph Trebesch for
sharing his deep knowledge of the sovereign debt literature, giving extremely
valuable advice on research ideas and helping me to overcome the obstacles on the
way to finishing this dissertation.
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at the Hertie School of Gov-
ernance. Anne and Till Cordes, Julian Schumacher, Anita Tiefensee and Gabi
Bru¨hl always helped me through the ups and downs of writing a thesis. My
work as a teaching assistant to Henrik Enderlein and Arntraud Hartmann was a
highly stimulating experience. Financial support by the German Research Foun-
dation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) under the Collaborative Research Center
700 (Sonderforschungsbereich 700) is gratefully acknowledged.
Special thanks goes to Johannes – both for being a brilliant co-author and a great
brother. I would like to thank my parents, Irmgard and Johann, for unconditional
support and their encouragement to follow what I consider the right path. Finally,
and above all, I thank Caro for her patience, understanding and continued support
during this long, and often challenging, academic journey.
IV
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Sovereign default risk in a federation 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Benchmark case: Centralized borrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 Decentralized borrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Case studies: Argentina and the euro area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.1 Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2 The euro area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Domestic redistribution through external default 34
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Motivating evidence and related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.1 Motivating evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.2 The economics of sovereign default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.3 Political determinants of default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.1 Haircut size and output loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.2 The household’s problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.3 Comparative statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.4 Political process and default decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
V
Contents
4 Reform support in times of crisis: The role of family ties 52
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 Motivating evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.2 Labor market and reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3.3 Voting on reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 Family ties and economic reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4.1 Individualistic case: α = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4.2 Completely altruistic case: α = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4.3 Incomplete altruism: 0 < α < 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.5 The role of wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.6 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6.1 Austerity and reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6.2 Wealth, inequality, and reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix to Chapter 4 79
A.1 Labor market and support for reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
A.1.1 Labor market flexibility ex ante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
A.1.2 Change in labor market flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.1.3 Sensitivity for various parameter combinations . . . . . . . . 81
A.1.4 Insider share and effects of reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.1.5 Correlation of employment states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.2.1 Incomplete altruism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.2.2 Risk aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.3 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.3.1 Index of labor freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.3.2 Family ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Bibliography 89
Overview of separate papers and co-authorship 102
VI
List of Tables
2.1 Overview of results for given values of default cost η . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Comparison of debt levels between symmetric and benchmark case . 19
2.3 Further results of the symmetric case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Overview of results in the asymmetric case with γ = 0.5 . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Welfare in the asymmetric case with γ = 0.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Welfare comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1 Family ties and labor market freedom in selected euro area countries 59
4.2 Overview of the model’s parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 Reform threshold as a function of the degree of risk aversion . . . . 73
A.1 Reform threshold as a function of ex ante labor market flexibility . . 80
A.2 Reform threshold as a function of the change in labor market flexibility 81
A.3 Reform threshold as a function of labor market characteristics . . . . 82
A.4 Reform threshold for varying outsider income and insider disutility 83
VII
List of Figures
4.1 Youth unemployment in crisis countries 2005–2014 . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Reform decision as a function of the insider share η . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Majority vote as a function of the change of insider wage and of the
insider share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Majority vote as a function of altruism and insider share for ∆η = 0.05 72
4.5 Reform threshold as a function of wealth w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
VIII
List of Abbrevations
CRRA Constant Relative Risk Aversion
ECB European Central Bank
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ESM European Stability Mechanism
HDI Human Development Index
IMF International Monetary Fund
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
WVS World Values Survey
IX
1 Introduction
When the Great Recession hit the world economy in 2008, GDP in many countries
dropped massively and unemployment soared, in particular in Europe and the
United States. As a response to this extremely large shock, governments around
the world engaged in very expansive fiscal policy to attenuate the most severe
consequences of the crisis. In hindsight, there is widespread agreement among
economists that the relatively quick and resolute fiscal response has saved the
global economy from collapse. However, these rescue measures came at a price.
Budget deficits rocketed in many countries, leading to severe debt problems.
In the euro area, some countries had already accumulated excessive debt levels
before the outbreak of the crisis and were consequently pushed to the edge of
exclusion from international capital markets. Only a concerted reaction by the
European Central Bank (ECB) and euro area governments – culminating in the
creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) – was able to avoid a break-up of the euro area. The
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is still recovering from the repercussions
of the crisis. Only in 2017 the euro area reached its pre-crisis level of GDP.
Unemployment, especially among the young, remains very high in many countries
and monetary policy still operates at the zero lower bound, additionally supported
by massive asset purchases through the ECB.
The experiences of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis have
revived economists’ interest in research on sovereign debt and default, which was
pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). In the 1980s, in particular countries in
Latin America experienced an unprecedented series of sovereign defaults, which
sparked research efforts in the field. The debt problems of numerous euro area
member states, especially Greece’s default in 2012, have shown that sovereign debt
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crises are not an exclusive phenomenon of emerging economies, which in turn led
to a new wave of academic interest in sovereign default.
Moreover, the traumatizing experience of a possible break-up of the young
European currency union spurred a debate on how to improve the resilience of
European economies and the currency union as a whole. A lack of competitiveness
and inflexible economic structures on the national level were identified as main
culprits for the outbreak of and the slow recovery from the crisis. As a consequence,
the necessity of structural reforms in the member states (including the liberaliza-
tion of product and labor markets, the reform of legal and pension systems and
privatizations) was highlighted by economists and politicians alike.
However, the implementation of reforms met massive political resistance in
many member states of the euro area as the long-term benefits of reform usually
go along with partly significant short-term costs, which are often borne by small,
but powerful groups of society. It is therefore important to develop an improved
understanding of the factors that determine political resistance to reform. This
dissertation aims to contribute both to the literature on sovereign debt crises (Chap-
ters 2 and 3) and to the political economy of reform (Chapter 4).
In Chapter 2, we study the interaction between a country’s federal fiscal structure
and sovereign default risk within a stylized two-period model of a federation.
Numerous countries with chronic external debt problems are characterized by
inefficient federal fiscal structures. However, the impact of a country’s federal
design on sovereign default risk has barely been studied in previous work. This
chapter aims to address this gap.
As a starting point, we develop a benchmark case in which only the central
government can borrow in international capital markets. The government is
utilitarian and maximizes a representative household’s welfare by using external
borrowing and potential default as a tool for consumption smoothing. This setting
corresponds to the common approach in sovereign debt models. Next, we allow for
decentralized borrowing by two symmetric regions (i.e. the regions are identical
with regard to all characteristics: size, endowment, preferences, default costs and
political influence on the central government) that can borrow individually from
international lenders and are only concerned with the welfare of their respective
2
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constituencies. The central government maximizes the welfare of the federation
as a whole and decides whether to default on the federation’s aggregate debt,
which is the sum of the regional debt levels. This setting implies a soft budget
constraint between central and regional governments, as the latter anticipate a
potential bail-out. As a result, when making decisions on lending to the regions,
foreign investors determine the price of loans based on the level of aggregate rather
than regional debt. We show that decentralized borrowing leads to higher interest
rates, a higher aggregate debt level, an increased default probability and lower
welfare compared to the benchmark of centralized borrowing.
In a next step, we relax the assumption of symmetry among regions and ana-
lyze how diverging default costs affect the model’s endogenous variables. This
asymmetry is motivated by a relatively recent strand in the empirical sovereign
debt literature which finds that sovereign default leads to a reduction of output
via a negative impact on the private sector, in particular due to reduced credit
supply to domestic firms from international financial markets. Since industries vary
significantly in their degree of dependence from international loans, heterogeneous
industry structures between regions of a federation lead to diverging regional
default costs.
Asymmetric default costs increase the inefficiency caused by decentralized bor-
rowing in our model. The region with low default costs incurs a disproportionate
level of debt, whereas the high-cost region’s debt level is too low from a welfare-
maximizing perspective. This is because regional governments are aware of the
impact of additional borrowing on the bond price and the default probability.
Therefore, the low-cost region can incur higher debt at the expense of the high-cost
region, as the latter will keep its borrowing inefficiently low to preserve a relatively
moderate aggregate debt level. As a consequence, debt of the federation as a whole
remains at a comparable level to the symmetric case, but regional debt and welfare
differ significantly. Overall, the federation’s welfare further decreases.
To illustrate the relevance of the model’s assumptions and implications, we first
present a case study of Argentina as the features of the model are well reflected in
the politico-economic system of Argentina. We argue that decentralized borrowing
by the provinces and soft budget constraints through implicit and explicit guaran-
tees by the central government have indeed played a significant role for the severe
3
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sovereign debt problems that characterize Argentina’s economic history. Next, we
discuss the implications of our analysis with regard to the euro area and argue that
the model can shed some light on developments in the run-up to and during the
debt crisis in the euro area.
Chapter 3 analyzes how domestic distributional incentives influence sovereign
default on debt held by foreign creditors. The analysis is motivated by the ‘lost
decade’ for Latin America’s economic development in the 1980s. Debt crises
haunted the region and led to an unprecedented series of sovereign defaults. While
this decade marked a particularly severe episode, debt problems have plagued
many Latin American countries ever since attaining independence. Besides its
history of defaults, pronounced income inequality has been and still is a striking
characteristic of the region.
This chapter theoretically analyzes a potential connection between these phe-
nomena. Does the distribution of income within a country affect the government’s
decision to default on its external debt obligations? And in case of default, does
income inequality affect the outcome of a debt restructuring, i.e. the size of creditor
losses (‘haircuts’)?
We propose an affirmative answer to these questions. The reason is that external
default does not only redistribute wealth between international creditors and the
sovereign debtor as highlighted in most of the sovereign debt literature, but also
has distributional effects within a defaulting country. Building on recent empirical
findings on sovereign defaults, the main contribution of this chapter is to carve out
a potentially important theoretical channel that rationalizes a positive correlation
between the extent of income inequality and both default probability and size.
Hence, our contribution is to improve the understanding of the trade-off between
efficiency losses of sovereign default and domestic redistribution, a question that
has found little attention in previous work.
Concretely, to analyze the relation between income distribution and external de-
fault risk, we develop a formal framework building on a static public finance model
and add (non-enforceable) external debt as a novel feature. This approach deviates
from the traditional sovereign debt literature which focuses on representative agent
models and hence cannot account for the role of income heterogeneity among
4
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domestic agents. Moreover, we do not follow the common approach of modeling
default as a binary choice between complete default and full repayment. In line
with real-world sovereign debt crises, we treat creditor losses as a continuous
variable which represents partial defaults. As our analysis focuses on domestic
distributive aspects of default, allowing for a partial default is helpful as it captures
the ‘size of the cake’ which can be redistributed. Finally, we assume that the
government is not benevolent but opportunistic in the sense that it follows the
median household’s preferred policy.
More specifically, our theoretical line of argument goes as follows. Households
face a trade-off: On the one hand, default on debt held by foreign creditors is
costly because the domestic private sector suffers from deteriorating external fi-
nancing conditions. This leads to inefficiencies in production which cause a drop
in output. The output loss is increasing in haircut size as higher haircuts lead to
worse financing conditions and longer capital market exclusion. On the other hand,
default benefits households since resources initially earmarked for debt service
can be reallocated to public spending. Households are asymmetrically affected
by a default depending on their relative income position within society. We show
that the households’ preferences for default are inversely ordered by income, i.e.
the higher a household’s income share, the lower the preferred haircut. This is
because the larger is a household’s share of overall income the more painful is the
output loss associated with a marginal increase of the haircut size. Conversely,
a relatively poor household prefers a higher haircut as the utility loss from a
reduction in output is small compared to the benefit of additional government
spending. The policy finally implemented depends on the political regime. We
show that, compared to a social planner, an opportunistic government within a
median voter framework is more prone to default.
Chapter 4 (with Johannes Brumm, published in Economic Inquiry) contributes to
the literature on the political economy of reform. We argue that an important
determinant of voters’ support for economic reform is the strength of family ties in
society. While the ‘crisis hypothesis’ predicts that crises facilitate reform, we show
in a political economy model that this relation can break down, and even reverse,
when agents take into account the effect of reform on their family members.
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To provide a concrete illustration of the mechanism that relates intra-family
altruism and voting behavior, we consider a labor market reform within an insider-
outsider framework. As a first step of the formal analysis, we develop a benchmark
scenario without altruism: the individualistic case. In this scenario all outsiders are
in favor of reform whereas all insiders oppose it and thus the rationale of the crisis
hypothesis applies: if the economic situation deteriorates, the share of outsiders
rises and so does support for reform.
Next, we extend the model by introducing intra-family altruism. We first assume
that agents value their family members’ well-being as strongly as their own: the
completely altruistic case. In this scenario it can occur that outsiders who would
prefer reform in the absence of altruism now vote against it as they take into
account the effect of reform on their family members. Consider a ‘mixed family’
that consists of one insider and one outsider. Reform jeopardizes the insider’s
income but improves the job perspectives of the outsider who could become an
insider in case of reform. We show that, depending on the degree of altruism, the
family member who is an outsider votes in favor of reform only if the improvement
in employment perspectives is sufficiently good. If the outlook is not good enough,
the outsider also prefers to preserve the status quo which ensures one high and
secure insider income that can be shared between family members via transfers.
If, however, the chances for the outsider family member to obtain an insider job
through reform are relatively good, the insider family member might even support
reform.
Thus, strong family ties do not necessarily reduce support for reform, yet they
substantially alter the relation between economic circumstances and support for
reform. This is our key insight: the implication of the crisis hypothesis might be
reversed in the presence of intra-family altruism – in times of crisis opposition
to the implementation of reform is strong whereas good economic circumstances
might even encourage reform.
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2.1 Introduction
Numerous countries with persistent external debt problems are characterized
by federal systems in which the interplay of different government layers creates
welfare-decreasing externalities. For example, the design of the fiscal relations
between the federal level and the provinces in Argentina is regarded as a main
reason for the country’s notorious history of debt crises, in particular due to soft
budget constraints between the regions and the central government (see, among
others, Acemoglu, 2003 and Mussa, 2002).1 It is therefore highly relevant to develop
a detailed understanding of the link between fiscal federalism and sovereign debt
crises.
But while the problem of soft budget constraints has been extensively studied
in research on fiscal federalism, it has attracted little attention in the sovereign
debt literature in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). This is surprising
as sovereign debt models are often calibrated to Argentine data due to its com-
prehensive history of external debt crises. But although Argentina is the classic
country of reference for research on sovereign debt, the role of its federal system
for external debt accumulation is widely neglected. Supposedly, the reason why
these two literature strands are not more strongly interlinked is that, on the one
hand, research on fiscal federalism mostly focuses on redistributive aspects with
regard to the domestic tax system and only allows for domestic debt (and excludes
the option of default). The access to external debt is usually not considered.
1. Empirical work by Rodden and Wibbels (2010) highlights the problem of soft budget constraints
between different layers of government for several federations.
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On the other hand, the bulk of theoretical work on sovereign debt focuses on the
insurance aspect of default and builds on representative agent models: A benevo-
lent government uses external non-contingent debt and potential default to insure
the representative household against adverse endowment shocks. This approach
necessarily ignores heterogeneity among agents, which is however required to
model a federal system.
The contribution of this chapter is to make a first step to overcome the gap
between these two research areas. We embed a federal political system into a two-
period sovereign debt model and analyze the impact of decentralized borrowing
by regional governments on bond prices, debt levels, the probability of default and
overall welfare of the federation.
As a starting point, we develop a benchmark case without decentralized regional
borrowing. A utilitarian government maximizes a representative household’s wel-
fare by using external borrowing and potential default as a tool for consumption
smoothing. This setting corresponds to the common approach in sovereign debt
models. Next, we allow for decentralized borrowing by two symmetric regions
(i.e. the regions are identical with regard to all characteristics: size, endowment,
preferences, default costs and political influence on the central government) that
can borrow individually from international lenders and are only concerned with
the welfare of their respective constituency. The central government maximizes the
welfare of the federation as a whole and decides whether to default on the federa-
tion’s aggregate debt, which is the sum of the regional debt levels.2 This approach
implies a soft budget constraint between central and regional governments, as the
latter anticipate a potential bail-out. As a result, when making decisions on lending
to the regions, foreign investors determine the price of loans based on the level of
aggregate rather than regional debt. We show that decentralized borrowing leads to
higher interest rates, a higher aggregate debt level, an increased default probability
and lower welfare compared to the benchmark of centralized borrowing.
We then relax the assumption of symmetry among regions and analyze how
diverging default costs affect the model’s endogenous variables. Introducing
asymmetric default costs is motivated by a relatively recent strand in the empirical
2. The assumption of centralized default is in line with theoretical and empirical work on default
(see, for instance, Kim and Zhang, 2012, and Eichler and Hofmann, 2013).
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sovereign debt literature that analyzes the nexus between sovereign and private-
sector costs of default (see Arteta and Hale, 2008, and Kohlscheen and O’Connell,
2008, for pioneering work). This work shows that sovereign default leads to a
reduction of output via a negative impact on the private sector, in particular due to
reduced credit supply to domestic firms from international financial markets.
Since industries vary significantly in their degree of dependence on external
capital (see, for example, the seminal contribution by Rajan and Zingales, 1998),
heterogeneous industry structures between regions of a federation lead to diverg-
ing regional default costs. This asymmetry increases the inefficiency caused by
decentralized borrowing in our model. The region with low default costs incurs
a disproportionate level of debt, whereas the high-cost region’s debt level is too
low from a welfare-maximizing perspective. This is because regional governments
are aware of the impact of additional borrowing on the bond price and the default
probability. Therefore, the low-cost region can incur higher debt at the expense
of the high-cost region, as the latter will keep its borrowing inefficiently low to
preserve a relatively moderate aggregate debt level. As a consequence, debt of
the federation as a whole remains at a comparable level to the symmetric case,
but regional debt and welfare differ significantly. Overall, the federation’s welfare
further decreases.
To illustrate the relevance of the model’s assumptions and implications, we
first present a case study of Argentina as the features of the model are well
reflected in the politico-economic system of Argentina. We argue that decentralized
borrowing by the provinces and soft budget constraints through implicit and
explicit guarantees by the central government have indeed played a significant
role for the severe sovereign debt problems that characterize Argentina’s economic
history. Next, we discuss the implications of our analysis with regard to the euro
area. We argue that our model can shed some light on developments in the run-up
to and during the debt crisis in the euro area. Finally, we derive policy implications
with regard to the institutional architecture of the euro area.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the related literature.
Section 2.3 develops the model setup. The case studies are presented in Section 2.4
and Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Related literature
The chapter is mainly related to research on fiscal federalism and to the literature on
sovereign default. In the decentralized scenario, our model implicitly assumes a soft
budget constraint between the regional and the federal levels, as the latter provides
a certain degree of insurance to the regions through potential centralized default.
The soft budget constraint is an important concept in the work on fiscal federalism
and was originally formulated by Kornai (1986) to shed light on economic behavior
in socialist economies (also see Kornai et al., 2003, for a detailed discussion).
Economic implications of the soft budget constraint have been comprehensively
analyzed in theoretical work (among others, see Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995,
Goodspeed, 2002, Lockwood, 2002, Besfamille and Lockwood, 2008, and Robinson
and Torvik, 2009). Numerous empirical studies demonstrate the existence of and
inefficiencies caused by soft budget constraints in many federal countries (see, for
example, Rodden, 2002, Rodden et al., 2003, Rodden and Wibbels, 2010, and von
Daniels, 2016).
Empirical work provides evidence that central governments often assume the
responsibility for unsustainable regional debt, which in turn increases the likelihood
of default by the central government (see Eichler and Hofmann, 2013). Moreover,
as in our model, theoretical work on decentralized borrowing by the private sector
also assumes centralized default (see Jeske, 2006, Wright, 2006, and Kim and Zhang,
2012). While these authors focus on private-sector external borrowing, we analyze
decentralized borrowing by sub-sovereign governments.
As described above, regional governments often have a soft budget constraint
vis-a`-vis the central government, i.e. central governments (explicitly or implicitly)
guarantee regional external debt. As a consequence, when pricing loans to regional
governments, foreign lenders often provide equal financing conditions to very
unequal regions regarding economic fundamentals (see, for instance, Sola and
Palomba, 2015).
The second literature strand this chapter builds on is the classic sovereign debt
literature in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008). This
10
2 Sovereign default risk in a federation
work mainly builds on representative agent models.3 A benevolent government
uses external non-contingent debt and potential default to insure the household
against adverse endowment shocks. In these models, non-repayment is costly due
to temporary capital market exclusion (thereby taking away the insurance mecha-
nism) and output losses. An important difference to the models that analyze soft
budget constraints in the literature on fiscal federalism (for example, Goodspeed,
2002) is that interest rates are endogenous. The international investor internalizes
the risk of default, which in turn affects bond prices. This important feature is also
present in our model.
The assumption of diverging regional default costs builds on research on the
public-private nexus of sovereign default. A growing strand of the sovereign debt
literature analyzes private sector costs of external public debt and default (see
Arteta and Hale, 2008, Kohlscheen and O’Connell, 2008, and Agˇca and Celasun,
2012). This empirical work finds that sovereign debt crises have adverse spill-over
effects on the domestic economy through large declines of foreign credit to the
domestic corporate sphere (see Arellano et al., 2017, and Kaas et al., 2016, for
quantitative sovereign debt models that analyze this channel).
In addition to these results, the question which industries are particularly affected
by external credit constraints is of relevance to our analysis. As described in their
seminal paper on financial dependence and growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998)
show that industries vary strongly in their dependence on external finance. ‘Young’
companies and high-technology industries (e.g. computing and pharamceuticals)
heavily depend on external finance, whereas mature industries – agriculture being
the prime example – do not require significant external financing at all. Hence, the
former are much more affected by reduced credit supply through international
capital markets caused by sovereign default. Several recent studies allow a more
sophisticated look at the public-private nexus of external default. Acharya et al.
(2014) and Ferrando et al. (2017) show that increasing sovereign risk negatively
spills over to both the financial sector and the non-financial sector. He´bert and
Schreger (2017) show in a case study of Argentina that foreign-owned firms,
3. More recent work introduces heterogeneity in sovereign debt models. For instance, D’Erasmo
and Mendoza (2016) allow for wealth heterogeneity among agents and analyze distributional
incentives for domestic sovereign default.
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exporters and banks suffer disproportionately from default. Moreover, spillovers of
increased sovereign risk to the private sector are present both in emerging markets
and developed economies (Augustin et al., 2016, and Bedendo and Colla, 2015).
2.3 The model
Consider a two-period economy with stochastic endowments. The political system
is composed of a central government and two regional governments. Borrowing is
decentralized, i.e. each region can borrow individually in international financial
markets. Debt is non-enforceable. The decision whether or not to default on aggre-
gate debt is made by the central government, regions cannot default individually.
This assumption reflects a bailout of the regions through the federal government,
a situation often observed in real-world sovereign debt crises (see, for instance,
Eichler and Hofmann, 2013). Sub-national governments maximize the utility of a
regional representative household, whereas the central government maximizes the
welfare of the federation as a whole.
In the following, we first derive a benchmark case without decentralized borrow-
ing. This setting corresponds to the common approach in sovereign debt models: A
utilitarian government maximizes a representative household’s welfare by using ex-
ternal borrowing and potential default as a tool for consumption smoothing. Next,
issuing debt is decentralized, which means that borrowing decisions now take place
at the regional level, but the default decision remains with the central government.
Regions are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. they are identical with regard to all
characteristics: size, preferences, default costs and political influence on the central
government. We then study how the interaction between the regional and the
central governments affects debt levels, bond prices and the default probability
compared to the benchmark. Finally, we introduce heterogeneity among regions
regarding default costs and analyze how this adjustment affects the endogenous
variables of the model.
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2.3.1 Benchmark case: Centralized borrowing
A benevolent government borrows in period 0 to smooth a representative house-
hold’s consumption over the model’s two periods. For simplicity, we assume there
is no endowment in period 0 such that consumption can only be financed via
external borrowing. The only asset traded in the economy is a non-contingent
one-period bond b issued by the government in period 0. International lenders are
assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive lending market and are risk-neutral.
Hence, given a risk-free world interest rate r, expected profits of international
lenders are zero. In period 1, the household receives endowment y and the gov-
ernment decides whether to default on period 0 debt or to repay, depending on
the exogenous cost of default η and the realization of the endowment in period 1.
Utility of the representative household over the two periods is given by:
u(c0, c1) = ln (c0) +E (c1)
where c0 and c1 denote the respective consumption levels and E(·) refers to the
expected utility in period 1, depending on repayment or default.4 The budget
constraint of the representative household in period 0 is given by
c0 = q(b)b
where q(b) denotes the bond price. Under the zero-profit assumption for interna-
tional lenders, the bond price q(b) is set as follows:
q(b) =
1− p(b)
1+ r
where p(b) denotes the probability that the central government decides to default in
period 1 and r denotes the risk-free rate. The budget constraint of the representative
household in period 1 depends on the central government’s decision whether to
4. Note that the utility function is only concave in period 0 utility and linear in period 1 utility. This
assumption significantly reduces the model’s complexity without affecting the general results.
Moreover, note that we implicitly assume a discount factor of one. Again, this assumption
simplifies the analysis without affecting the model’s qualitative results.
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default or not. In case of repayment the period 1 budget constraint becomes:
c1 = y− b
Endowment y is uniformly distributed over the unit interval: y ∼ U[0, 1]. If the
government decides to default, the budget constraint takes the following form:
c1 = (1− η)y
where η denotes the exogenously given output cost of default. In period 1, the
benevolent government (after observing the realization of endowment y) decides
whether to default or not based on the solution to the following optimization
problem:
max
d∈{0,1}
{vd=01 (b, y), vd=11 (y)}
where vd=01 (b, y) and v
d=1
1 (y) denote the values of the social welfare function in
period 1 (after the realization of y) in case of repayment and default, respectively.
Substituting from the budget constraints, the welfare functions can simply be
expressed as:
vd=01 (b, y) = y− b , vd=11 (y) = (1− η)y
Hence, the government is indifferent between repayment and default at the thresh-
old value of y, y = bη . If the realization of y is below the threshold value y, the
central government defaults whereas it repays if y exceeds the threshold. The
threshold’s composition is intuitive: in case of large debt the likelihood of default
increases whereas default becomes less likely if the cost of non-repayment is high.
In period 0, the government chooses debt level b to maximize the representative
household’s utility over the model’s two periods and hence solves the following
problem:
max
b
{ln[q(b)b] +
∫ y(b)
0
[(1− η)y]dy +
∫ 1
y(b)
(y− b)dy}
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Solving for the the first-order condition yields:
[q(b)b]−1[∂q(b)
∂b
b + q(b)] + (1− η)y∂y(b)
∂b
+
∫ 1
y(b)
(−1)dy− (y− b)∂y(b)
∂b
= 0
Since endowment y is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, default proba-
bility p(b) = y = bη , and therefore q(b) =
1−y
1+r =
η−b
η(1+r) and
∂q(b)
∂b = −[η(1+ r)]−1,
we obtain:
[
b(η − b)
η(1+ r)
]−1[ η − 2b
η(1+ r)
] +
(1− η)b
η2
+
2bη − b− η2
η2
= 0
This expression further reduces to
η − 2b
b(η − b) −
(η − b)
η
= 0
and finally yields
b3 − 2b2η + b(η2 + 2η)− η2 = 0.
For given values of η, this cubic equation can be solved in closed form. If η = 0
the solution is b = 0, which is intuitive since in the absence of any default cost
it is always optimal for the central government to default. Anticipating that,
international lenders are unwilling to provide loans to the government. Stipulating
concrete values for the default cost η yields the results in Table 2.1 for the optimal
debt level b∗, the bond price q(b), the default threshold y, and the representative
household’s expected utility u(·).5
The results show that an increasing default cost η leads to a higher optimal
debt level b∗, at a higher bond price q(b) – which implies lower refinancing costs
for the government – and a decreasing default threshold y, implying a lower
default probability. Moreover, the utility of the household is strictly increasing with
5. We assume a risk-free rate of 1%, which is standard in sovereign debt models (see Mendoza and
Yue, 2012).
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Table 2.1: Overview of results for given values of default cost η
η b∗ q(b) y u(·)
0.1 0.049 0.501 0.493 -3.248
0.2 0.097 0.507 0.487 -2.605
0.3 0.144 0.514 0.480 -2.248
higher default costs (for the entire range of endowment y).6 We now analyze the
case of decentralized borrowing and compare it to the benchmark of centralized
borrowing.
2.3.2 Decentralized borrowing
Regional governments now make individual borrowing decisions. In a first step we
analyze the case of two regions that are identical with regard to all characteristics
(i.e. size, preferences, default costs and welfare weight in the central government’s
value function), called the symmetric case. We then analyze an asymmetric case by
allowing for differing regional default costs.
Symmetric case
In contrast to the centralized case, the borrowing decision is now made by the
regional governments. The default decision (on aggregate debt), however, remains
with the central government. Since the model is solved by backward induction, we
first analyze the central government’s problem in period 1.
The central government’s problem
The central government’s only action is to decide whether or not to default on
aggregate debt in period 1. As in the benchmark case, the government observes
the realization of the endowment which again is uniformly distributed over the
unit interval, but now equally split between the two regions, which are denoted by
6. The results in Table 2.1 and the following analysis should not be interpreted quantitatively. The
aim of this chapter is to derive theoretical channels that can help to guide future quantitative
and empirical work.
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subscripts A and B. Moreover, the central government observes the aggregate debt
level, which is the sum of the regional debt levels, B = bA + bB, and then decides
whether to default or not based on the solution to the following optimization
problem:
max
d∈{0,1}
{vd=01 (B, y), vd=11 (y)},
where vd=01 (B, y) and v
d=1
1 (y) again denote the values of the social welfare function
in period 1 in case of repayment and default, respectively. Due to the linear utility
in period 1, the values are simply given by:
vd=01 (B, y) = y− B , vd=11 (y) = (1− η)y
Hence, the value of y at which the central government is indifferent between
repayment and default is y = Bη .
Regional governments
In the symmetric case the representative regional households’ preferences are
identical and represented as follows:7
u(c0, c1) = ln(c0) +E(c1)
Equivalent to the benchmark case, the economy is endowed with stochastic income
y in period 1. The endowment is equally distributed among regions, so each region
receives y/2. Regions can issue bonds bi (where i = A, B) in period 0 which mature
in period 1. Debt bi is priced according to q(B). Importantly, recall that the price of
debt depends on the federation’s aggregate debt B = bA + bB, and is not priced
according to region-specific fundamentals.
Hence, the budget constraint for representative regional household A (the fol-
7. Since the two regions are identical, we drop notation that distinguishes the regions whenever
possible in order to ensure readability.
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lowing results are derived from region A’s perspective) in period 0 is given by:
c0 = q(B)bA
The bond price is determined by
q(B) =
1− p(B)
1+ r
.
The budget constraints are given by
c1 = y/2− bA and c1 = (1− η)y/2,
depending on repayment or default, respectively. Regional government A chooses
bA in period 0. Importantly, since each regional government is only concerned with
the welfare of its respective representative household, it issues bonds of a size that
is individually optimal. However, it must take into account that the cost of debt is
increasing with the level of aggregate debt. Hence, region A takes as given region
B’s debt level bB and solves the following problem:
max
bA
{ln[q(B)bA)] + [
∫ y(B)
0
[(1− η)y/2]dy +
∫ 1
y(B)
(y/2− bA)dy]}
where y(B) = B/η is the threshold value of y at which the central government is
indifferent between repayment and default. The first-order condition yields:
[q(B)bA]−1[
∂q(B)
∂bA
bA + q(B)] + [(1− η)y(B)/2∂y(B)∂bA
+
∫ 1
y(B)
(−1)dy− (y(B)/2− bA)∂y(B)∂bA ] = 0
Since q(B) = 1−p(B)1+r =
η−B
η(1+r) , we obtain
∂q(B)
∂bA
= − 1
η(1+r) . Moreover,
∂y(B)
∂bA
= η−1.
Finally,
∫ 1
y(B)(−1)dy = B/η − 1. Hence, the first-order condition becomes:
[
(η − B)bA
η(1+ r)
]−1[η − B− bA
η(1+ r)
] + (1− η) B
2η2
− 1+ B
η
− (B− 2ηbA
2η2
) = 0
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which further reduces to
η − 2bA − bB
bA(η − bA − bB) +
1.5bA + 0.5bB − η
η
= 0
and finally yields
1.5b3A − b2A(2.5η − 2bB)− bA(1.5ηbB − 0.5b2B − η2 − 2η)− η2 + ηbB = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the two identical regions choose the same optimal
debt level bi. Therefore, we can set bA = bB = bi. This yields
4b3i − 4ηb2i + bi(η2 + 3η)− η2 = 0.
We can now compare the results of the symmetric case to the benchmark case.
First, we again stipulate concrete values for default cost η and derive the respective
values for regional debt bi, aggregate debt B (which is then compared to the debt
level in the benchmark case), bond price q(B) and utility u(·).
Table 2.2: Comparison of debt levels between symmetric and benchmark case
η B Benchmark
0.1 0.0664 0.0493
0.2 0.1323 0.0974
0.3 0.1977 0.1441
The results in Table 2.2 show that for a given default cost η, the aggregate debt
level B (i.e. the sum of the regional debt levels) in the case of decentralized bor-
rowing is strictly larger than in the benchmark case. The results for the remaining
endogenous variables are reported in Table 2.3.
As the bond price q(B) is decreasing in the aggregate debt level B, the cost of
borrowing is higher in the decentralized scenario. Moreover, since the probability
of default is given by B/η, it is larger in the decentralized case compared to the
benchmark. Finally, the federation’s welfare is strictly lower in the decentralized
scenario (see Table 2.6 on page 22 for an overview of welfare levels in the three
different scenarios).
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Table 2.3: Further results of the symmetric case.
η q(B) y Regional utility Aggregate utility
0.1 0.332 0.664 -3.601 -7.203
0.2 0.335 0.661 -2.943 -5.887
0.3 0.337 0.659 -2.573 -5.147
Asymmetric regional costs of default
We now allow for asymmetry between regions with respect to the cost of default.
This difference is supposed to capture the nexus between sovereign risk and private-
sector refinancing costs. The underlying idea is that regions have different industry
structures in which firms are asymmetrically dependent on external capital. The
cost of sovereign default spills over to the private sector as firms incur higher
costs of refinancing. Consequently, the cost is higher for those regions in which
industries rely more heavily on external capital.
To capture this effect analytically, we introduce an ‘asymmetry parameter’ γ ∈
[0, 1]. In case of default, the region with higher default costs receives utility (1−
η(1+ γ))y in period 1 whereas the region with lower costs obtains (1− η(1− γ))y.
Obviously, if γ = 0 there is no asymmetry and the situation boils down to the
symmetric case. If γ = 1, the high-cost region carries the entire burden of default,
whereas the other region incurs no default cost at all.
We now analyze the impact of asymmetry on the debt level, bond price, default
probability and welfare. First, note that the period 1 decision of the central
government remains unaffected, since only the aggregate debt level (and the
realization of the endowment) matter for the default decision. The default threshold
hence remains B/η. We assume that region A is the high-cost region and region B
the low-cost region. Region A hence solves the following problem:
max
bA
{ln[q(B)bA)] + [
∫ y(B)
0
[(1− η(1+ γ))y/2]dy +
∫ 1
y(B)
(y/2− bA)dy]}
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which yields the first-order condition for high-cost region A:
η − 2bA − bB
bA(η − bA − bB) +
2bA + bB − 0.5(1+ γ)(bA + bB)− η
η
= 0
Accordingly, the first-order condition for low-cost region B becomes:
η − 2bB − bA
bB(η − bB − bA) +
2bB + bA − 0.5(1− γ)(bB + bA)− η
η
= 0.
Assuming an asymmetry parameter γ = 0.5, the solution to the first-order condition
yields the following results, as depicted in Table 2.4:
Table 2.4: Overview of results in the asymmetric case with γ = 0.5
η bhigh−cost blow−cost B y q(B)
0.1 0.033 0.033 0.066 0.664 0.332
0.2 0.065 0.066 0.132 0.661 0.335
0.3 0.097 0.100 0.197 0.659 0.337
The results for the regional debt levels, aggregate debt B, default probability y
and bond price q(B) are almost identical to the symmetric case. However, as can
be seen in Table 2.5, the regional utility levels are diverging significantly.
Table 2.5: Welfare in the asymmetric case with γ = 0.5
η uhigh−cost ulow−cost usymmetric
0.1 -3.799 -3.771 -3.601
0.2 -3.145 -3.091 -2.943
0.3 -2.780 -2.698 -2.573
The low-cost region obtains a strictly larger utility level than the high-cost region.
This is because the low-cost region can free-ride on the high-cost region as the
latter reduces the borrowing costs for the federation as a whole. As a consequence,
the low-cost region incurs higher debt than optimal from the federal perspective,
whereas the high-cost region keeps its borrowing inefficiently low to preserve a
relatively moderate aggregate debt level, anticipating that higher aggregate debt
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increases the probability of default. Compared to the symmetric case, the high-cost
region is always worse off, whereas the low-cost region can attain utility levels
similar or even slightly above (for low levels of y and high values of η) the ones
in the symmetric case. Aggregate welfare, however, is always smaller than in the
symmetric case (see Table 2.6).
Table 2.6: Welfare comparison
η Centralized
Decentralized
&
Symmetric
Decentralized
&
Asymmetric
0.1 -3.248 -7.203 -7.571
0.2 -2.605 -5.887 -6.237
0.3 -2.248 -5.147 -5.478
Table 2.6 summarizes the welfare implications of the different scenarios. Decen-
tralized borrowing leads to higher debt levels, at higher yields, increased default
probability and lower welfare compared to the benchmark scenario of centralized
borrowing. Consequently, the welfare of the federation as a whole is strictly larger
in the centralized scenario. Introducing diverging default costs leads to distorted
regional borrowing incentives that further increase aggregate welfare losses.
2.4 Case studies: Argentina and the euro area
This section discusses the model’s assumptions and implications in light of the
Argentine default history on the one hand and with regard to the euro area debt
crisis on the other hand. The case of Argentina aims to highlight the important
interaction between fiscal federalism and sovereign default risk (in our model the
comparison between the benchmark case and the symmetric case).8 The discussion
8. The federal system of Argentina has been subject to numerous case studies in economics and
political science (see, among others, Acemoglu, 2003, and Remmer and Wibbels, 2000). We
therefore only focus on those aspects that are relevant for our analysis, without giving a detailed
account of the history, politics and economics of Argentine federalism.
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of the euro area mainly focuses on the aspect of distorted borrowing incentives
through diverging regional default costs (the asymmetric case in the model).
2.4.1 Argentina
Due to its extensive default history, Argentina is the prime example referred to in
the sovereign debt literature (for surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature
on sovereign debt, see Aguiar and Amador, 2014, and Tomz and Wright, 2013,
respectively). In numerous studies, quantitative dynamic sovereign debt models
are calibrated to Argentine data (see, for instance, the seminal contribution by
Arellano, 2008). However, these models usually ignore the fiscal structure of the
country.
Our abstract theoretical analysis can of course only reflect part of the complex
Argentine politico-economic system and its default history. Nevertheless, an infor-
mal mapping of the model’s elements to the Argentine case can help to highlight
the relevance of a country’s federal fiscal architecture for debt accumulation and
default decisions.
The model’s crucial assumptions and implications are (i) a federal system with
decentralized borrowing; (ii) a default history in which the center assumed respon-
sibility for sub-sovereign debt; (iii) (almost) identical pricing of sub-sovereign debt
despite diverging economic fundamentals; (iv) heterogeneous regions regarding
economic development, which implies diverging regional costs of sovereign default;
and (v) distorted borrowing incentives for regions with low default costs as these
incur sub-optimally high debt levels, and vice versa for high-cost regions. In the
following, these aspects are discussed in more detail with regard to Argentina.
Argentina’s debt crises and fiscal federalism in a nutshell
Since attaining independence in 1816, Argentina defaulted eight times on its
sovereign debt, four defaults occurred since the beginning of the 1980s. The most
recent case took place in 2014 and the default of 2001/2002 resulted in one of
the largest debt restructurings in history (only outstripped by Greece’s default in
2012). Argentina defaulted on about 100 billion dollars of its debt owed to private
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creditors, which represented 37 percent of GDP in 2001. Moreover, GDP decreased
by about 14 percent following the default (see Arellano, 2008).
Argentina is a highly decentralized country, both fiscally and politically. Regional
governments dispose of strong expenditure and borrowing autonomy, even in
global perspective (see, for instance, Tommasi et al., 2001). The provinces are
responsible for a large share of total spending, but they only collect a small fraction
of overall taxes. This allocation of competences leads to a significant vertical
fiscal imbalance (see Jones et al., 2000). In 2008, almost a third of the Argentine
provinces – mostly economically backward ones – received transfers from the
central government that made up more than 80% of their total revenue (Ardanaz
et al., 2014).
Moreover, provinces can borrow relatively autonomously in international capital
markets. In the run-up to the default of 2001/2002 provincial debt increased
significantly. The spending spree led to a bailout by the federal government
that assumed provincial debt equivalent to 10.8 percent of GDP (von Daniels,
2016). In the year of the provincial bailout, the central government defaulted
on its obligations to international creditors – corresponding to the mechanism
described in our model. As shown by Nicolini et al. (2002), such bailouts of regional
governments have occurred frequently during the recent decades – either through
direct financing of regional debt, or indirectly, for instance by the assumption of
costs for provincial pension systems through the central government.
These cases suggest that the federal system in Argentina indeed has a severe soft
budget constraint problem, which has led Mussa (2002) to argue that Argentina’s
federal structure is mainly responsible for the country’s chronically critical fiscal
situation: ‘Many of Argentina’s fiscal problems [. . . ] arose from inadequate fiscal
discipline in the provinces [. . . ] [which] are perennially in deficit and, from time to
time, have called on the central government to assume responsibility of their debts’
(p. 14 f.).
Sub-sovereign bond yields and the soft budget constraint
Our analysis assumes that international investors offer the same lending conditions
to all regions, independent of their economic fundamentals. In the presence of
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a hard budget constraint between central and regional governments, financial
markets whould charge risk premia from regions with worse fiscal fundamentals.
Under a soft budget constraint, however, this link is expected to weaken or break
down as investors might anticipate a bail-out through the center (or through
inter-regional compensation).
This link between (the absence of significant) risk premia and soft budget
constraints – and hence an important assumption of the model – is backed by
recent empirical research. For example, Beck et al. (2017) find that the positive
link between sub-sovereign debt and risk premia tends to break down when sub-
sovereign government debt is relatively high, which could reflect the market’s
expectation of a federal bailout as fundamentals deteriorate. Sola and Palomba
(2015) find that market pricing becomes less effective in the presence of guarantees
from the central government. Using secondary market data from the US, Canada,
Australia and Germany, they show that the pricing of risk premia for sub-national
governments is less responsive to fiscal fundamentals when there is some form of
implicit or explicit guarantees from the center. More generally, in a panel analysis
of up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993 – 2008, Eichler and Hofmann (2013)
find that higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign
default risk.
The concrete case of Argentina supports the conjecture that investors anticipate
a regional bail-out through the center and hence do not demand (significantly)
diverging risk premia from the provinces. Della Paolera and Grandes (2012) analyze
the period from 1997 to 2002, when Argentine provinces were significantly tapping
funds abroad. They show that in the run-up to the default of 2001/2002 the credit
ratings of economically quite different provinces were equal (or at most differed
one notch on the rating scale) and unchanged for years, and subsequently were all
sharply downgraded in the first and second quarters of 2001, just before the peak
of the debt crisis.
Also today the equal treatment of economically very diverging Argentine
provinces continues to be common practice. For instance, both the City of Buenos
Aires and the province of Chaco dispose of the same credit rating (at B2 on Moody’s
rating scale in December 2017, which implies ‘speculative and subject to high credit
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risk’).9 While the former province ranks second among all Argentine provinces on
the Human Development Index (HDI) and has a diversified economy with a focus
on banking and manufacturing, the latter ranks last on the HDI.10 The province of
Chaco has the lowest GDP per capita and the highest poverty rate in Argentina and
generates income mainly through an underdeveloped agricultural sector. Moody’s
justifies this same rating for the two regions by arguing that it ‘reflects the very
close economic and financial linkages that exist between Argentina’s government
and Argentine sub-sovereigns’.11
Public-private nexus of default and diverging default costs
In the asymmetric case of the model, we assume diverging regional default costs.
This assumption is motivated by the heterogeneity of regional industry structures.
The economic structure in Argentina is indeed very heterogeneous. The provinces
are quite diverse regarding economic development - ranging from highly urban-
ized and industrialized to very poor and rural (see Remmer and Wibbels, 2000).
Advanced industries that depend on external finance are mainly located in and
around Buenos Aires, whereas the rather poor provinces in the periphery barely
dispose of advanced industries (see the comparison of the City of Buenos Aires
and the province of Chaco above).
A recent case study of Argentina by He´bert and Schreger (2017) finds that
foreign-owned firms, exporters and banks suffer disproportionately from default,
which confirms findings in numerous earlier studies on the cost spillover from
the public to the private sector. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the costs of
default are diverging significantly between the Argentine provinces.
The key implication of the asymmetric case of our analysis is that regions with
low default costs can free-ride on the high-cost regions when it comes to debt
accumulation, which in turn leads to welfare losses for the federation as a whole. In
the case of Argentina it is difficult to support this theoretical implication empirically
due to limited availability of data on sub-sovereign debt levels. Moreover, it is
9. Information taken from Moody’s website: www.moodys.com (Accessed January 3, 2018).
10. Data provided by the United Nations Development Programme: www.undp.org (Accessed
January 3, 2018).
11. See Moody’s website: www.moodys.com (Accessed January 3, 2018).
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difficult to obtain evidence that confirms the hypothesis that regional governments
have been aware and have deliberately made use of the interaction of regional debt
levels described in the model. However, in the following we argue that this channel
might have indeed been at work in the euro area during the financial and debt
crises.
2.4.2 The euro area
The cases of Argentina and the euro area differ significantly on many levels
(including federal design and economic development). Still, in the following we
argue that our analysis can also shed some light on developments in the run-up to
and during the European financial and debt crises. Building on this analysis, we
derive policy implications with regard to the institutional architecture of the euro
area.
The role of the ESM and the ECB
The euro area is of course not a classic federation as it lacks a central government.
However, we argue that both the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy since the
outbreak of the crisis (in particular through the start of quantitative easing in March
2015) and the fiscal support to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus through
the EFSF/ESM adjustment programmes can be interpreted as similar to the role of
the central government in our model. Both measures provide relief on the debt
burden of the member states through reduced interest payments. For instance,
Greece saved 9.9 billion euros (amounting to 5.6% of GDP) due to favorable funding
costs in 2016, thus providing a significant relief for its budget.12 Since the central
government in our model does not issue own debt, but merely decides on how to
cope with the federation’s aggregate debt, this interpretation is even closer to our
model then the Argentine case.
12. Calculations are taken from the website of the ESM: www.esm.europa.eu/impact-budgets
(Accessed January 10, 2017).
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Convergence of borrowing costs
The euro area is a striking example of the convergence of borrowing costs for
economically very different countries. Following the introduction of the euro, the
yields of EMU’s member states quickly converged to the yield of the German
bund (see, for example, Ehrmann et al., 2011). This convergence process is often
interpreted as proof that the financial markets did not judge the prohibition of
bail-outs in the euro area (stipulated in Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union) as credible, implying a soft budget constraint problem in
the euro area (see, for instance, Baskaran and Hessami, 2017). The president of
the German central bank, Jens Weidmann, supports this interpretation by arguing
‘that the no-bail-out clause lacked credibility [...], that might also explain why even
highly-indebted member states had only very low risk premiums on their debt
in the euro’s first decade. Consequently, the financial markets failed to have a
disciplining effect on government finances.’13
Default costs and member states’ debt accumulation
The differences in the level of economic development in the euro area are quite
large. For instance, GDP per capita in the Netherlands reached over 41 thousand
euros in 2016, whereas Portugal’s was below 18 thousand euros. The diverging
degrees of economic development are also reflected in the member states’ industry
structures. For example, in 2016 agriculture’s share of total gross value added was
0.6% in Germany and industry contributed 25.6%. The corresponding numbers for
Greece are 4.0% and 13.4%, respectively.14 Theses differences in industry structures
and economic development imply that the private sector costs of default should
also differ between member states. In the asymmetric scenario of the theoretical
analysis this leads to a situation in which regions with low default costs can
free-ride on high-cost regions as the latter aim to maintain moderate borrowing
costs. As a consequence, the low-cost region incurs higher debt than optimal
from the union’s perspective, whereas the high-cost regions keep their borrowing
13. Speech ‘The euro area as a union of stability’, held on October 8, 2013 (Accessed via the website
of the Bundesbank on January 8, 2018: www.bundesbank.de).
14. Data are taken from Eurostat: www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat (Accessed January 9, 2018).
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inefficiently low to preserve a relatively moderate aggregate debt level, anticipating
that higher debt increases the probability of default (which can be interpreted as a
threat to the overall stability of the currency union).
The development of debt levels in the euro area’s member states is in line with
this prediction. For instance, at the introduction of the euro in 1999, Portugal’s
public debt was at a very moderate level (51% of GDP). The debt-to-GDP ratio
then steadily increased to 96% in 2010, and soared during the crisis to 130% in
2016. Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio has been above 100% in every year of the 2000s
and rocketed after the outbreak of the debt crisis to 181% of GDP in 2016. An
inverse development can be observed in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands.
Germany’s public debt peaked in 2010 at 81% of GDP, but decreased steadily
since the outbreak of the debt crisis to 68% of GDP in 2016. The Netherlands
have traditionally maintained a comparatively low public debt level. Since the
introduction of the euro until the outbreak of the debt crisis in 2010, the Netherlands
never violated the Maastricht debt criterion of 60% of GDP. As a response to the
crisis, the debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 68% in 2014, but again decreased to 62% in
2016.15
As in the case of Argentina, it is difficult to find proof that governments are
aware of the mechanism described in the asymmetric scenario and that they have
deliberately considered it in their policy choices. However, at least anecdotal
evidence indicates that the channels might indeed be at work in the euro area.
Former German finance minister Wolfgang Scha¨uble argued in 2011 that the
‘European Monetary Union won’t succeed if a number of countries persistently run
deficits [...] at the expense of the euro’s stability.’16 This statement is in line with
the model’s prediction for the low-cost region’s choices on debt accumulation.
However, more interesting is whether the conjecture can be supported that the
high-cost regions incur sub-optimally low levels of debt in order to maintain the
stability of the currency union as a whole. We argue that this is indeed the case.
An official statement of the German government following the European Council
15. Data are taken from Eurostat: www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat (Accessed January 9, 2018).
16. Speech ‘A comprehensive strategy for the stabilization of the Economic and Monetary Union’,
held on 18 May 2011 at the Brussels Economic Forum (Accessed via the website of the Federal
Ministry of Finance on January 7, 2018: www.bundesfinanzministerium.de).
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of June 2011 describes at some length the government’s efforts to bring down the
public debt level and the intention to stick to the Maastricht criteria. The statement
then concludes: ‘With this development Germany significantly contributes to the
stabilization of the euro area. Also in the future, we remain the anchor of stability
in Europe (translation by the author).’17
The ambition to keep the public debt at a moderate level is in line with the
implications of the model. Of course, the continuing strong performance of the
German economy significantly contributes to the decrease of the debt-to-GDP
ratio. Hence, the question remains whether the public debt is indeed sub-optimally
low. The ongoing debate in Germany on a potential lack of public investment
gives a hint that the debt level might indeed not be optimal from Germany’s own
perspective. In 2015, Germany spent 2.1% of GDP on public investment, which is
the second lowest share in the entire euro area.18 In 2013, when Germany was still
recovering from the financial crisis, the IMF’s Article IV country report on the one
hand emphasized that ‘Germany plays an important role in stabilizing the region
due to its strong balance sheets and safe haven status’, but also warned that ‘fiscal
overperformance should be firmly avoided’ and that ‘planned expenditures should
be accelerated, especially for public investment’.19 More recently, a commission
of economic experts argued that ‘Germany’s investment performance in both
the public and the private sector is currently quite weak’ and that ‘compared to
other major economies, Germany’s capital stock is not very modern and must be
upgraded.’20 Hence, the claim that an increase of debt financed public investment
might be optimal for Germany appears to be justified, which is also supported by
the fact that Germany can borrow at historically low interest rates.
17. Information taken from the official website of the German federal government:
www.bundesregierung.de (Accessed January 7, 2018).
18. Data are taken from Eurostat: www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat (Accessed January 9, 2018).
19. Information taken from the website of the IMF: www.imf.org (Accessed January 10, 2018).
20. See ‘Increasing investment in Germany: Report prepared by the expert commission on behalf of
the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy’, accessed via the website of the Federal
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy on January 11, 2018: www.bmwi.de.
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Policy implications
The problem of excessive sovereign debt in some member states and the question
how debt management should be regulated is at the heart of the debate on how
to reform the euro area architecture to make it more shock-resistant. With the
experiences of the financial and debt crises in mind, proponents of further deepen-
ing of EMU argue that increased risk-sharing (for example via a euro area budget
that serves as shock absorber) is crucial to make the common currency sustainable
in the long-run. Critics, however, emphasize that such measures would further
exacerbate moral hazard problems which are regarded as a main cause of the debt
crisis in the first place. This political controversy has led to increased academic
interest in the question how the euro area can be fiscally stabilized without causing
politically unacceptable free-riding problems (see, for example, the discussion on a
European safe asset in Brunnermeier et al., 2017).
In this context, we derive two main policy implications from the analysis. First,
our model implies that more centralized borrowing in the euro area could reduce
rather than increase free-riding in the monetary union. As described in the case
study on the euro area, the often excessive debt levels some member states of the
euro area had accumulated following the introduction of the common currency
can be interpreted as free-riding by individual governments as they could expect
to be bailed out through the monetary union as a whole (either fiscally by other
member states or through the monetary policy of the ECB). Our analysis implies
that a more centralized debt management might help to attenuate this free-riding
problem and could increase the welfare of the currency union as a whole. However,
increased risk-sharing would also require increased sovereignty sharing, as the
capacity of individual member states to issue debt at their own discretion would
have to be limited (which is of course a politically highly sensitive issue).
Second, an implication of our analysis is that the more homogeneous is the
development level of industries in the currency union’s member states, the weaker
are the free-riding incentives as also the costs of sovereign default converge. Besides
numerous other reasons, this aspect provides a political economy argument in
favor of stronger economic convergence in the euro area. As discussed above,
more advanced industries are more heavily depending on external capital and
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therefore incur higher costs in case of sovereign default on external debt. In a
federation, low-cost regions have an incentive to over-borrow at the expense of
high-cost regions. This inefficiency is reduced when the costs of default for the
regions of a federation converge.
2.5 Conclusion
Previous theoretical work on sovereign debt has barely analyzed the link between
a country’s federal design and external default risk. We aim to fill this gap by
developing a sovereign debt model with an embedded federal political system.
Regional governments can borrow individually while the central government
decides whether to default on aggregate debt of the federation (i.e. the sum of
regional debt levels). We show that decentralized borrowing leads to higher debt
levels, at higher interest rates, increased default probability and lower welfare
compared to a benchmark case of centralized borrowing. The inefficiency is
amplified in case of diverging regional default costs: Regions with low default
costs (because of their economy’s relative independence from external capital) have
an incentive to over-borrow at the expense of regions with higher costs. As a
consequence, in order to keep aggregate debt at a moderate level, high-cost regions
borrow less then socially optimal.
We discuss case studies of Argentina and the euro area to illustrate the model’s
assumptions and implications and finally derive policy implications, in particular
with regard to euro area governance. We argue that debt mutualization (of newly
issued debt) potentially decreases rather than increases moral hazard problems
and that economic convergence might reduce free-riding incentives for the member
states’ governments.
This chapter is a first step to improve the understanding of external default risk in
federations. While we focus on deriving potentially important theoretical channels,
future research might analyze the relevance of these channels in a fully dynamic
quantitative model. Moreover, it would be interesting to further relax assumptions
made in our model. For example, Argentina provides a striking example of an
unbalanced division of political and economic power between regions. Ardanaz et
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al. (2014) illustrate that Buenos Aires (city and province), Cordoba and Santa Fe
are home to almost two thirds of the Argentine population and these provinces
produce 71% of GDP (data from 2008). However, they only dispose of 16.7% of the
representatives in the Senate. This imbalance could motivate different weights of
regions in the central government’s welfare function, which might further increase
default risk.
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3.1 Introduction
The 1980s have been a ‘lost decade’ for Latin America’s economic development.
Debt crises haunted the region and led to an unprecedented series of sovereign
defaults. While this decade marked a particularly severe episode, debt crises
have plagued many Latin American countries ever since attaining independence.1
Besides its infamous default history, pronounced income inequality has been and
still is a striking characteristic of the region.2 This chapter theoretically analyzes a
potential connection between these phenomena. Does the distribution of income
within a country affect the government’s decision to default on its external debt
obligations?3 And in case of default, does income inequality affect the outcome of
a debt restructuring, i.e. the size of creditor losses (‘haircuts’)?
We propose an affirmative answer to these questions. The reason is that external
default does not only redistribute wealth between international creditors and the
sovereign debtor as highlighted in most of the sovereign debt literature, but
also has distributional effects within a defaulting country. Building on recent
empirical findings on sovereign defaults, the main contribution of this chapter is to
1. See Reinhart and Trebesch (2016) and Kaminsky and Vega-Garcı´a (2016) for historical accounts
of sovereign defaults.
2. At the end of the 1980s the average Gini coefficient in Latin America was 50.0. Inequality
reached an all-time high of 56.0 in the 1990s. Although the income gap in Latin America has
narrowed since the beginning of the 21st century, it still remains the most unequal region in the
world (see Tsounta and Osueke, 2014). In 2004, the average Gini coefficient was 52.5 in Latin
America, which is 8 points higher than in Asia, 18 higher than in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, and 20 higher than in the developed countries (see Gasparini and Lustig, 2011).
3. We refer to external debt as debt held by foreign creditors.
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carve out a potentially important theoretical channel that rationalizes a positive
correlation between the extent of income inequality and both default probability
and size. Hence, our contribution is to improve the understanding of the trade-
off between efficiency losses of sovereign default and domestic redistribution, a
question that has found little attention in previous work.4 Concretely, to analyze
the relation between income distribution and external default risk, we develop
a formal framework building on a static public finance model and add (non-
enforceable) external debt as a novel feature.5 This approach deviates from the
traditional sovereign debt literature which focuses on representative agent models
and hence cannot account for the role of income heterogeneity among domestic
agents. Moreover, we do not follow the common approach of modeling default
as a binary choice between complete default and full repayment. In line with
real-world sovereign debt crises, we treat creditor losses as a continuous variable
which represents partial defaults. As our analysis focuses on domestic distributive
aspects of default, allowing for a partial default is helpful as it captures the ‘size of
the cake’ which can be redistributed. Finally, we assume that the government is not
benevolent but opportunistic in the sense that it follows the median household’s
preferred policy.
More specifically, our theoretical line of argument goes as follows. Households
face a trade-off: On the one hand, default on debt held by foreign creditors is costly
because the domestic private sector suffers from deteriorating external financing
conditions. This leads to inefficiencies in production which cause a drop in output.
The output loss is increasing in haircut size as higher haircuts lead to worse
financing conditions and longer capital market exclusion. On the other hand,
default benefits households since resources initially earmarked for debt service
can be reallocated to public spending. Households are asymmetrically affected
by a default depending on their relative income position within society. We show
4. Although related to the classic sovereign debt literature in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), this chapter is not a contribution to research on debt dynamics. Instead of studying debt
accumulation, default frequencies and market access over time, we analyze the role of domestic
distributive incentives on a government’s decision to default for a given level of debt at a given
point of time. As a consequence, studying the impact of income inequality on debt dynamics is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
5. This class of models is particularly suited to study distributional policies. See Persson and
Tabellini (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) for extensive discussions.
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that the households’ preferences for default are inversely ordered by income, i.e.
the higher a household’s income share, the lower the preferred haircut. This is
because the larger is a household’s share of overall income the more painful is the
output loss associated with a marginal increase of the haircut size. Conversely,
a relatively poor household prefers a higher haircut as the utility loss from a
reduction in output is small compared to the benefit of additional government
spending. The policy finally implemented depends on the political regime. We
show that, compared to a social planner, an opportunistic government within a
median voter framework is more prone to default.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents evidence that motivates
our work and discusses related theoretical research. We develop the formal frame-
work and discuss the model’s implications in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Motivating evidence and related literature
In the following, we first present the evidence that motivates our argument. We
then discuss related research on economic and political determinants of default
and describe how our analysis departs from this work.
3.2.1 Motivating evidence
A relation between income distribution and sovereign risk has already been identi-
fied in the 1980s. In an early empirical study on the determinants of external default,
Berg and Sachs (1988) argue that their ‘most striking finding is that higher income
inequality is a significant predictor of a higher probability of debt rescheduling [. . . ]’
(p. 271). They conclude that regarding the frequency of sovereign defaults ‘Latin
American countries rank near the very top [. . . ] while the East Asian economies are
near the bottom’ (p. 289). The latter countries are traditionally characterized by low
income inequality, whereas Latin America is the most unequal region in the world
(see Gasparini and Lustig, 2011, and Tsounta and Osueke, 2014). Surprisingly,
these findings only had little impact on the theoretical sovereign debt literature.
Recent studies confirm the findings of Berg and Sachs (1988). Based on a panel
dataset of 56 countries ranging from 1994-2010, Jeon and Kabukcuoglu (2016) find
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a negative correlation between income inequality and sovereign credit ratings.6 In
a similar vein, and using data from 50 countries, Aizenman and Jinjarak (2012) find
that an increase in the Gini index by one point (on a scale of 0-100) is associated
with a higher sovereign spread of 45 basis points.
Regarding private households’ preferences for default, evidence from public
opinion polls supports the conjecture that the position within a society’s income
spectrum plays an important role for citizens’ attitude towards sovereign default
on external debt. Tomz (2002) administered a survey in Argentina during the debt
crisis of 2001-2002 and found that poor and unemployed citizens were less likely
to support repayment than those with greater assets and more job security. Curtis
et al. (2014) provide similar findings. They analyze the 2011 referendum on debt
repayment in Iceland, the so called ‘Icesave’ referendum. This referendum took
place in the wake of the severe banking crisis in Iceland and constitutes the only
occasion in which the population was asked to vote directly on sovereign debt
resettlement terms. They find that the income position within society indeed affects
preferences for debt repayment: Citizens with extensive investment assets voted
for repayment, whereas the unemployed tended to vote against repayment. This
preliminary evidence hints at potentially important domestic distributional effects
of external default.
3.2.2 The economics of sovereign default
The sovereign debt literature has paid comparatively little attention to the impact
of domestic distributional conflict on external default. This mainly results from its
focus on representative agent models. The classic approach to sovereign default
dates back to the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and has been
refined, among others, by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).7 In
these models, a benevolent government that maximizes the representative agent’s
welfare faces the following trade-off: On the one hand, default is beneficial since it
serves as insurance mechanism against adverse output shocks. On the other hand,
6. In the literature, sovereign bond ratings are widely used as predictors of default (see Reinhart,
2002, and Reinhart et al., 2003).
7. For recent surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on sovereign debt, see Aguiar and
Amador (2014) and Tomz and Wright (2013), respectively.
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non-repayment is costly due to temporary capital market exclusion and, in most
models, additional output losses.8 This approach to external default is apolitical
in the sense that it exclusively focuses on economic incentives for default and
does not take into account two important political factors: Domestic distributional
conflict and the government’s regime type. However, these aspects are considered
more and more important for the understanding of sovereign default.9 Tomz and
Wright (2007) have shown that the standard model is unable to fit historical default
episodes in a satisfactory way and argue that ‘a model of default that includes not
only economic but also political shocks [. . . ] could account for significantly more
of the historical record than models that are currently available’ (p. 359).
3.2.3 Political determinants of default
The impact of domestic distributional conflict on sovereign risk has found rel-
atively little attention in the literature. Some work has analyzed distributional
consequences of default on domestic debt (e.g. Tabellini, 1991, Dixit and Londregan,
2000). In a recent paper, D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016) argue that domestic default
can be optimal when domestic debt is high enough and its ownership is sufficiently
concentrated. This paper differs from our work as we consider external debt and
the government is not utilitarian.
Some recent research has also focused on the relation between external debt and
heterogeneity among domestic agents. Ferriere (2015) investigates the interaction
between the incentive to default and the distributional cost of taxes in a standard
sovereign debt model with heterogeneous agents, progressive taxation, and elastic
8. More generally, the starting point of the literature is the question why sovereign debt can
exist at all since claims by creditors are not (or hardly) legally enforceable. A large body of
research is devoted to this question, in particular to the identification of default costs that might
explain why governments ever repay foreign debt. Many sources of default costs have been
discussed in the literature. Traditional explanations refer to capital market exclusion (Eaton
and Gersovitz, 1981), sanctions like trade embargos (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989), and reputational
spillovers (Cole and Kehoe, 1998). More recent work discusses informational costs (Andreasen,
2015 and Sandleris, 2008) and adverse spillovers of sovereign default to the private sector as
important sources of default costs (Arteta and Hale, 2008, and Kohlscheen and O’Connell, 2008).
Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and Panizza et al. (2009) provide overviews on sources of default
costs.
9. For a review of the literature on ‘political defaults’, see Hatchondo et al. (2009) and Hatchondo
and Martinez (2010).
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labor supply. She finds that committing to a more progressive tax system that
reduces after-tax inequality is an effective policy tool to reduce sovereign credit
spreads in highly indebted countries. In contrast to this chapter, her focus is on
the design of the tax system and she considers a utilitarian government. Cusato
Novelli (2017) studies sovereign default in an economy in which self-interested and
myopic political parties bargain over the budget. He shows that countries with a
higher degree of political instability and fragmentation are more likely to default.
Whereas Cusato Novelli (2017) focuses on competition between political parties
and its effect on default, we investigate the role of income distribution among
domestic households for an opportunistic government’s policy choice. Dovis
et al. (2016) study redistributive policies in an overlapping generations model
without commitment in which the government’s incentive to accumulate external
debt is affected by inequality. The equilibrium dynamics in their model resemble
the populist cycles documented in many developing countries – generous public
spending on transfers followed by austerity. Whereas Dovis et al. (2016) remain
silent on size and likelihood of default as a consequence of inequality, these aspects
are the main focus of our work.
Also the role of regime type – autocratic versus democratic – is not well under-
stood. As pointed out by Andreasen et al. (2016), standard sovereign debt models
implicitly assume an autocratic regime because governments can always implement
the policies they desire to without facing any kind of resource or political constraint.
Guembel and Sussman (2009) argue that the ‘source of the theoretical difficulty
(the debt enforcement problem, comment by the author) is not just the absent
property rights but also the representative agent assumption that has dominated
the literature so far’ (p. 1297). They develop a political economy model and find
that once this assumption is given up there may be an incentive for the government
to repay its debt even in the absence of default penalties. In our model, we also
depart from the assumption of a social planner maximizing a representative agent’s
welfare. However, in contrast to the work by Guembel and Sussman (2009), in this
chapter default is costly and domestic bondholders are absent.
Whereas the role of regime type has been neglected in the economics literature
on sovereign risk, political scientists study the subject within the debate on the
‘democratic advantage’ (see North and Weingast, 1989, and Schultz and Weingast,
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2003). The basic idea is that voters want their government to generally comply with
international agreements. Hence, democratic institutions should be able to impose
stronger constraints on the government and thus make repayment promises by
democracies more credible as compared to autocratic regimes. As a consequence,
democratic institutions should allow for higher debt levels and lower borrowing
costs.
However, the argument is not uncontested. Saiegh (2005) finds that democracies
are more likely to reschedule their debt, and paid interest rates are at least as high
as in autocracies. DiGiuseppe and Shea (2016) analyze the influence of sovereign
borrowing on leader survival and find that authoritarian regimes are more likely to
use debt-financed policies to ensure political survival than democracies. Enderlein
et al. (2008) analyze whether regime type matters for government behavior during
debt restructurings. They find that, conditional on default, democracies behave
more aggressively than autocracies during debt renegotiations. A potential expla-
nation for this result might be that in a situation of financial distress voters choose
to constrain governments in order to avoid compliance with international creditors
because a default’s benefit outweighs its cost. Tomz (2002) also provides evidence
that compliance depends on the state of the economy. He shows that the majority
of Argentine citizens preferred to repay the external debt in 1999 but opted for
default in 2001. He argues that ‘after a three-year economic recession that showed
no signs of abating, citizens would no longer tolerate government spending cuts
and tax increases’ (p. 13). This change of attitude towards debt repayment is in line
with the argument that agents only prefer to comply with international agreements
when it is deemed optimal from an economic point of view. Research has also
focused on the question how different democratic regimes behave towards debt
repayment. Saiegh (2009) shows that coalition governments default less often than
unified ones. An empirical study by van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) reveals that
parliamentary regimes pay their debt more often than other types of democracies.
In our model, we analyze the impact of domestic distributional conflict on an
opportunistic government’s decision to default on external debt obligations. The
median voter setting is an inherently democratic one which therefore allows to
analyze how the decision on default differs from the (autocratic) social planner
approach.
40
3 Domestic redistribution through external default
3.3 The model
Consider an economy with a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of households, where n
is odd. Households differ in income. Parameter αi represents household i’s
share of aggregate output y where α1 ≤ α2 ≤ . . . ≤ αn, and ∑ni=1 αi = 1. The
median household’s income share αm (where m = n+12 ) is below average income:
αm < α = n−1, so the income distribution is skewed to the right. This assumption
is consistent with evidence from virtually every country.
The government inherits an exogenous amount of sovereign debt d which is held
by foreign creditors. In line with most of the literature, d is not subject to external
enforcement. We exclude the possibility of debt rollover, so the government must
either fully repay or (partially) default on the debt.
The economy is endowed with income y (h) = θ f (h) where θ is an exogenous,
stochastic income component and θ > 0. Variable h captures the haircut size. It is
continuous and defined over the interval [0, 1], where h = 0 represents full debt
service as stipulated in the debt contract and h = 1 indicates a complete default
on debt. Values within the interval capture the percentage of investor losses and
hence can be interpreted as the outcome of a partial default. Moreover, we assume
f (0) = 1 and f (1) > 0, so θ represents the level of output in the absence of
default and overall output y is strictly positive in case of complete default. The
government can freely set h which illustrates the country’s complete discretion
over debt repayment.10 Function f (h) is decreasing and concave ( f ′ (h) < 0 and
f ′′ (h) < 0 within the entire domain) in the government’s choice variable h. This
functional form captures the output cost of default and is derived from recent
empirical findings. In the following, we discuss the assumptions made on the
functional form in more detail since it is crucial for the trade-off we analyze in this
chapter.
10. This assumes that creditors have no bargaining power which is in line with the traditional
approach. However, some authors have started to explicitly model the renegotiation process as
a Nash bargaining game (e.g. Benjamin and Wright, 2013, and Yue, 2010).
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3.3.1 Haircut size and output loss
The assumptions made on the functional form of the endowment process are
motivated both by recent empirical findings and advances in theoretical work
on sovereign default. First, and in line with the literature, default is costly as it
leads to output losses. Modeling the cost of default as an exogenous reduction of
output has become common practice in sovereign debt models (see, among others,
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, and Arellano, 2008). However, these exogenous drops
in output have been criticized for their ad-hoc nature. Mendoza and Yue (2012)
endogenize the output cost of external default and provide an economic rationale
for the drop in GDP. They apply a general equilibrium setting to a sovereign debt
model in order to link default with private sector activity. In their model, sovereign
default leads to capital market exclusion of both the public and the private sector.
External capital is needed by private firms to pay for imported inputs which can
only be imperfectly substituted with domestic goods. Hence, sovereign default
causes an efficiency loss in domestic production which leads to an endogenous
output cost. The crucial assumption that sovereign default has adverse effects on
private sector access to capital markets is supported by empirical studies by Arteta
and Hale (2008), Kohlscheen and O’Connell (2008).
Second, the output loss is increasing in haircut size ( f ′ (h) < 0), an assumption
that we share with Arellano et al. (2013) who are the first to allow for partial
defaults in a dynamic sovereign debt model. Recent research by Cruces and
Trebesch (2013) and Trebesch and Zabel (2017) provides a justification for this
assumption. They show that higher haircuts are associated with significantly
higher subsequent sovereign bond yield spreads, longer periods of capital market
exclusion and larger drops in output. By linking the argument of Mendoza and
Yue (2012) with the findings of Cruces and Trebesch (2013), we argue that the
output loss of default is increasing in haircut size: A higher haircut leads to an
extended period of capital market exclusion which in turn prolongs inefficiencies
of production in the private sector and therefore causes larger cumulated output
losses.
Third, the marginal output loss of default is increasing in the exogenous com-
ponent of output: ∂
2y
∂h∂θ = f
′ (h) < 0. This implies that default is more costly in
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good states of the economy. Arellano (2008) shows that this assumption is crucial
to generate government default incentives that trigger default in bad states, at
non-negligible debt ratios, and at realistic default frequencies. Again, Mendoza and
Yue (2012) provide an economic justification for this assumption. Their analysis
of the link between sovereign default and private sector credit conditions yields
that the output cost of default is an increasing function of total factor productivity.
Our specification of the endowment process is in line with that finding because,
although there is no production in our model, the exogenous output component θ
can be interpreted as a proxy for total factor productivity.11
The timing of output realization is as follows. First, θ is realized and observed
by the households who then determine their respective preferred haircut size h∗i
(which can of course be zero). Next, the government implements the median
voter’s preferred haircut size h∗m and the final level of output y is realized and
distributed among households.
11. Also note that, since there is no domestic debt in our model, we implicitly assume that the
government can ‘target’ a default on foreigners. Guembel and Sussman (2009) and Broner
et al. (2010) question the ability of governments to discriminate between domestic and foreign
bondholders. The latter argue that discrimination is impossible in the presence of secondary
markets because foreigners can sell bonds to domestic agents thereby transforming foreign to
domestic debt. Note, however, that our specification of the endowment process does not depend
on the assumption of discriminatory default. What would happen in case of non-discrimination?
As pointed out by Acharya and Rajan (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2014), default would destroy
the balance sheets of domestic banks leading to a credit crunch that adversely affects the
domestic private sector. Hence, there is a negative impact on the domestic private sector’s
financing conditions in both the discriminatory and the non-discriminatory scenario.
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3.3.2 The household’s problem
Households have preferences over private and public consumption which are
represented by the following linear utility function:
u(ci, g) = ci + g
where ci represents private consumption of household i. Government spending
g is provided in the same, nonnegative, amount to every household: g ≥ 0. The
private budget constraint is given by
ci = (1− τ) αiy (h)
where τ is the income tax rate which is common for all income classes. The (per
capita) government budget constraint is given by
g = [τy (h)− (1− h)d]n−1
where d is the exogenous stock of external debt. Since we use a static model to
carve out the distributional aspect of default as clearly as possible, we can abstract
from the effect of savings and interest payments on d. Taxes are used to finance
government spending g. In addition, the budget constraint implies that default on
external debt d enables the government to expand the scope of public spending
since resources initially earmarked for debt service are made available. Since we
want to focus on a ‘willingness to pay’ problem we must assume τθ − d ≥ 0 such
that the government would be able to repay the due debt, but might not deem it
optimal to do so.
Households do not make a direct decision in the model, but depending on the
political process, the preferences of a pivotal household decide over debt repayment.
Hence, in a first step, we derive the respective households’ most preferred choice to
understand which factors determine a household’s preferences regarding default.
Depending on the income share αi, a household’s most preferred haircut size can
44
3 Domestic redistribution through external default
be derived as follows:
max
h
ui (h) = (1− τ) αiy (h) + α [τy (h)− (1− h) d] ,
where ui (h) represents household i’s utility as a function of haircut size h. Under
the assumptions made on y (h), ui (h) is strictly concave and twice continuously
differentiable in h. The Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions imply that
[(1− τ) αi + τα] θ f ′ (h) + αd ≤ 0 f or h = 0 (1)
[(1− τ) αi + τα] θ f ′ (h) + αd = 0 f or h > 0 (2)
The first-order conditions illustrate the household’s trade-off when it comes
to the determination of its most preferred policy choice.12 Consider the two
terms contained in the FOCs. The first term [(1− τ) αi + τα] θ f ′ (h) represents
the marginal cost of default since the output loss is increasing in haircut size
(remember that f ′ (h) < 0). The second term αd is the marginal benefit of default
because the higher the haircut size the more resources are made available for public
spending. Thus, each household trades off the deadweight output loss of a haircut
against the redistributive benefit of increased public spending.
In case of the corner solution h = 0, the cost of default outweighs the benefit, so
full repayment is the optimal choice. Solving Equation 1 for θ yields a first result
which relates default to the overall economic situation. We obtain
θ ≥ − αd
[(1− τ) αi + τα] f ′ (0)
This result implies that default is only an optimal choice from household i’s
perspective when θ falls below this threshold. If the exogenous output component
θ is above the threshold, then h∗i = 0 and hence full debt service is optimal from
household i’s perspective.
12. The second order condition is given by [(1− τ) αi + τα] θ f ′′ (h) < 0.
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Result 1. If θ ≥ − αd
[(1−τ)αi+τα] f ′(0) , full repayment (h = 0) is optimal from household i’s
perspective.
This result is consistent with the usual argument in the literature that default
occurs in states of the economy when output is low (see Aguiar and Gopinath,
2006, Levy-Yeyati and Panizza, 2011, and Tomz and Wright, 2007).
3.3.3 Comparative statics
We now analyze the case in which full repayment is not optimal (i.e. we consider
the interior solution h∗i > 0) and explore how changes in the exogenous variables
affect the size of default. The preferred haircut size is a function of a household’s
income share αi, the exogenous income component θ, debt level d, and tax rate τ:
h∗i = f (αi, θ, d, τ).
Proposition 1. An increase in household i’s income share αi implies a lower preferred
haircut size h∗i :
∂h∗i
∂αi
< 0.
Proof. Consider Equation 2 and recall that both f ′ (h) < 0 and f ′′ (h) < 0. Applying
the implicit function theorem yields
∂h∗i
∂αi
= − (1− τ) f
′ (h)
[(1− τ) αi + τα] f ′′ (h) < 0
This is the core result of our analysis. The optimal default size is inversely
ordered by the households’ income. The economic rationale is that the higher is
a household’s share of overall income the more painful is a marginal increase of
the haircut due to the output loss induced by default. The richer a household the
less it can be compensated by the increase in public spending. A relatively poor
household, on the other hand, prefers a higher default as the utility loss from a
reduction in output is small compared to the benefit of additional government
spending.
Interestingly, this chapter’s theoretical implication is in the spirit of Meltzer
and Richard’s (1981) seminal work on the ‘size of government’. They show that
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more unequal societies tend to have larger welfare spending since the median
voter demands more redistribution the more distant her income is from average
income. Analogous to Meltzer and Richard (1981), we find that the lower an
individual’s income, the higher is her demand for redistribution, in our case the
preferred haircut size. Whereas the distortionary character of taxes limits the
extent of transfers in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) work, the output loss of default
sets a limit to redistribution in our model. Hence, external default can serve
as an instrument for domestic redistribution. Persson and Tabellini (1994) and
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) describe a similar channel in their work on the effect of
income inequality on economic growth. They argue that income inequality exerts a
negative effect on growth, because it provides stronger incentives for redistributive
policies, which hurt growth-promoting investment. The effects of the exogenous
output component θ and debt level d on the haircut choice are summarized in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Household i’s preferred haircut size h∗i is increasing in debt level d and
decreasing in the exogenous output component θ:
∂h∗i
∂d
> 0;
∂h∗i
∂θ
< 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1. We obtain
∂h∗i
∂d
= − α
[(1− τ) αi + τα] θ f ′′ (h) > 0 and
∂h∗i
∂θ
= − f
′ (h)
θ f ′′ (h)
< 0
These results are consistent with established stylized facts of the sovereign debt
literature. In our model, marginally increasing the haircut size h becomes more and
more attractive for the government the higher is debt level d. This is because more
resources can be re-allocated to public consumption. This finding is in line with
the stylized fact that higher debt levels make default more likely (see Panizza et al.,
2009). As already discussed within the context of Result 1, the inverse relation
between default (size) and output is consistent with the stylized fact that defaults
usually occur in ‘bad times’.
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When it comes to the effect of an increase of the income tax on a household’s
preferred haircut size, the result is ambiguous.
Proposition 3. A higher income tax rate τ implies a higher (lower) preferred haircut size
h∗i if a household has above (below) average income α:
∂h∗i
∂τ
> 0i f αi > α;
∂h∗i
∂τ
< 0i f αi < α.
Proof. Again, proceeding as in Proposition 1, we obtain
∂h∗i
∂τ
=
(αi − α) f ′ (h)
[(1− τ) αi + τα] f ′′ (h)
This implies that if αi > α, then h∗i (τ) > 0. And, conversely, if αi < α, then
h∗i (τ) < 0.
In the model, taxes are non-distortionary and therefore a tax increase simply
reduces income heterogeneity by shifting resources from private to public consump-
tion (which are perfect substitutes for households). As a result, a higher tax level
leads to a convergence of the (conflicting) interests of rich and poor households:
In case of a tax increase, high income households prefer a higher haircut and vice
versa.
3.3.4 Political process and default decision
The political process determines how the conflicting preferences over default
translate into policy. We first derive the solution for a social planner who maximizes
a representative agents’s utility. This is the approach usually chosen in sovereign
debt models. Since utility is linear in both private and public consumption,
maximizing the utility of the household with average income coincides with the
social planner solution for the representative agent:
h∗α = arg max U(h)
where U(h) = ∑ni=1 ui (h) is the sum over all households’ utility.
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Departing from the social planner assumption and allowing for an opportunistic
government shows that income distribution has a direct effect on the default
decision. In that case the equilibrium haircut is the policy the median income
household prefers. Combining our central finding that a higher income share leads
to a lower preferred haircut ( ∂h
∗
i
∂αi
< 0) and the assumption that median income
is below average income (αM < α) yields the conclusion that a departure of the
median household’s income share from the one of the average income household
increases likelihood and size of default.13 Compared to the social planner, an
opportunistic government is more prone to default when the income distribution
is skewed to the right.
The model predicts that societies with a relatively wealthy middle class (the
median voters) are less likely to default on external debt. Also note that the kind
of inequality matters. On the one hand, if inequality increases because the middle
class gets relatively richer due to an income decline of the poorest, the likelihood
of default decreases. On the other hand, if income is more concentrated at the
top (thereby reducing relative income of the middle class), the equilibrium default
likelihood and size increase.
Our analysis can help to better understand under which circumstances demo-
cratic regimes tend to default. Contrary to the claim that voters always want
their government to comply with international agreements as argued within the
‘democratic advantage’ debate (e.g. Schultz and Weingast, 2003), we show that
agents decide on whether to comply or not conditional on their economic situation.
We do not provide any insight on the default behavior of autocratic regimes
in which citizens are unable to implement their political preferences. Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005) argue that ‘there is often a close association between what
nondemocratic regimes do and what the rich want’. If this argument also holds
for decisions on debt repayment we would expect to observe fewer defaults and
smaller haircuts in countries which are run by autocratic regimes. However,
evidence remains inconclusive on the question whether autocratic or democratic
regimes obtain more favorable credit conditions (see Beaulieu et al., 2012).
13. Note that the median voter theorem applies since the policy space is one-dimensional and the
households’ preferences over haircut size are single-peaked: ∂h
∗
i
∂αi
< 0.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter theoretically analyzes how domestic distributional conflict resulting
from income inequality affects a government’s decision to default on its external
debt obligations. We show that the larger is the distance between median and
average income, the more a country tends to default on its external debt. Historical
evidence is in line with this finding. We argue that this is because external default
can serve as a redistributive policy similar to a distortionary income tax a` la Meltzer
and Richard (1981) as the output cost of default is mainly incurred by high-income
households, whereas relatively poor ones benefit due to potentially smaller public
spending cuts. Our analysis implies that heterogeneity among domestic agents
and the nature of the political process are important determinants of sovereign
risk, aspects that have found comparatively little attention in the sovereign debt
literature.
The main objective of this chapter is to improve the understanding of the trade-off
between efficiency losses of sovereign default and domestic distributional concerns.
We have chosen a static approach in order to carve out the interaction between
income inequality and the government’s incentives to default for a given level of
debt at a given point in time. As a consequence, studying the impact of income
inequality on debt dynamics is beyond the scope of this chapter and is left to future
research.
This chapter focuses on income inequality, but heterogeneity along other di-
mensions might also be worth investigating. We think that departing from the
assumption of a benevolent government maximizing a representative agent’s utility
may yield further interesting questions for future research on politico-economic
factors of sovereign default. For instance, one might consider the effect of a
country’s federal fiscal design on sovereign risk. Due to its history of sovereign
defaults, quantitative dynamic sovereign debt models are frequently calibrated
to Argentine data. But these models usually ignore the federal fiscal structure
of a country. Interestingly, however, research on fiscal federalism identifies the
inefficient allocation of taxing and spending competences among different layers
of government as a main culprit for the notorious debt problems of Argentina.
50
3 Domestic redistribution through external default
Hence, future work should investigate the interaction between the federal fiscal
architecture of a country and the accumulation of sovereign debt in more detail.
It also appears sensible to consider scenarios in which the government follows
own objectives which differ from the population’s preferences. For instance, it
might want to repay debt in order to maintain access to international capital
markets although default would be optimal from a society’s welfare perspective.
Reasons for this might be that the government wants to finance special-interest
projects. Or, in line with the reasoning of Cole and Kehoe (1998), by avoiding
default, the government might want to keep up its reputation in other arenas of
international relations.
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4 Reform support in times of crisis:
The role of family ties
This chapter is joint work with Johannes Brumm and is published as:
Brumm, Elias and Brumm, Johannes (2017). ”Reform support in times of crisis:
The role of family ties”. Economic Inquiry 55.3, pp. 1416-1429.
4.1 Introduction
The Great Recession and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis have triggered the
most severe economic downturn in several southern European countries since
World War II. Unemployment, especially among the young, reached extremely
high levels in the ‘crisis countries’.1 While southern European labor markets are
traditionally characterized by high youth unemployment rates, the Spanish rate
of 56 percent in 2013 was nevertheless unprecedented. The data for Italy and
Portugal are staggering too, reaching rates around 40 percent. These statistics
illustrate severe structural problems which had been attenuated during the boom
of the early 2000s. Despite revealing these problems, the crisis has not led to
substantial liberalizing reforms in these countries. The Heritage Foundation’s
Index of Economic Freedom shows a stagnation in ‘labor freedom’ in the crisis
countries during the period 2007–2014.2 This lack of reform is puzzling as a
1. In the following, when we refer to ‘crisis countries’, we think of Italy, Portugal, and Spain. We
consider the case of Greece as too specific, in particular due to the continuous macroeconomic
surveillance by the EU and the IMF and the sovereign default in March 2012.
2. This index is a widely used measure of economic freedom (for example in Gassebner et al.,
2011). See Section 4.2 and the Appendix for a detailed description of the index and the other
data sources that we refer to in this section.
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sizable body of research in political economics argues that crises should facilitate
economic reform. The alleged inverse relation between the state of an economy
and a society’s willingness to reform has been coined the ‘crisis hypothesis’ (see,
among others, Drazen and Easterly, 2001). Rodrik (1996, p. 27) even claims a
tautological relation between crisis and reform: ‘[T]hat policy reform should follow
crisis [. . . ] is no more surprising than smoke following fire.’ The limited reform
effort in the crisis countries is at odds with the prediction of the crisis hypothesis.
To paraphrase Rodrik (1996), there is fire, but where is the smoke?
In this chapter, we describe a mechanism that rationalizes this lack of compre-
hensive reform. We argue that an important determinant of a society’s willingness
to reform has been neglected in the literature: family ties, specifically altruistic
links between parents and their working-age children. These links are particularly
strong in southern Europe, a fact that has long been highlighted in sociological
research (see, for example, Reher, 1998) and is confirmed by the results of the
‘World Values Survey’ (see, for instance, Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). In a political
economy model, we show that family ties and the resulting intra-family transfers
can affect voting behavior in a way that makes resistance to reform particularly
strong in times of crisis.
To provide a concrete illustration of the mechanism that relates intra-family
altruism and voting behavior, we consider a labor market reform within an insider-
outsider framework. We think of reforms as measures that cut back employment
protection, for instance a reduction of severance pay requirements. On the one hand,
such reforms lead to lower wages and/or higher risk of job loss for established
insiders. On the other hand, reform incentivizes firms to hire workers, thereby
increasing overall employment. The strong distinction between one insider and
one outsider group is for illustration purposes only. In line with the literature
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2002, Bentolila et al., 2012) we think of outsiders as those
who do not have access to protected jobs with above-equilibrium wages. This group
includes the unemployed, the underemployed, the fully employed on temporary
contracts as well as low-wage earners.
As a first step, we develop a benchmark scenario without altruism: the indi-
vidualistic case. In this scenario all outsiders are in favor of reform whereas all
insiders oppose it and thus the rationale of the crisis hypothesis applies: if the
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economic situation deteriorates, the share of outsiders rises and so does support
for reform. Next, we extend the model by introducing intra-family altruism. We
first assume that agents value their family members’ well-being as strongly as their
own: the completely altruistic case. In this scenario it can occur that outsiders who
would prefer reform in the absence of altruism now vote against it as they take into
account the effect of reform on their family members. Consider a ‘mixed family’
that consists of one insider and one outsider. Reform jeopardizes the insider’s
income but improves the job perspectives of the outsider who could become an
insider in case of reform. We show that, depending on the degree of altruism, the
family member who is an outsider votes in favor of reform only if the improvement
in employment perspectives is sufficiently good. If the outlook is not good enough,
the outsider also prefers to preserve the status quo which ensures one high and
secure insider income that can be shared between family members via transfers.
If, however, the chances for the outsider family member to obtain an insider job
through reform are relatively good, the insider family member might even support
reform. Thus, strong family ties do not necessarily reduce support for reform, yet
they substantially alter the relation between economic circumstances and support
for reform.
This is our key insight: the implication of the crisis hypothesis might be reversed
in the presence of intra-family altruism — in times of crisis opposition to the
implementation of reform is strong whereas good economic circumstances might
even encourage reform. This is the case even though we model the net social
benefit of reform to be higher in times of crisis than in better times. In addition,
we show that the crisis hypothesis still fails when family ties are weaker than in
the completely altruistic case.
Whereas the preceding findings are derived under risk neutrality we introduce
risk-aversion in a next step and show that it further strengthens opposition to
reform. Moreover, risk aversion allows us to analyze the role of wealth as a further
source of intra-family transfers. In fact, median net wealth in the crisis countries is
much higher than in many other euro area countries (see the ECB’s Eurosystem
Household Finance and Consumption Network, 2013). In our model with family
ties, the effect of wealth on mixed families’ support for reform is ambiguous. On
the one hand, wealth provides some insurance against reduced family income. On
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the other hand, however, wealthy mixed families are less in need of generating
additional income from a second insider job and are thus more reluctant to support
reform. The effect leading to reform fatigue dominates at high levels of wealth.
Moreover, an unequal distribution of wealth can further strengthen resistance to
reform.
This chapter is mainly related to work on the political economy of reform and to
the literature on the economic effects of family ties.3 In their seminal contributions,
Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) explain delays in and
non-adoption of beneficial reforms as the consequence of distributional conflict
between competing interest groups.4 The growing interest in the economics of
family ties mainly stems from the seminal contributions of Alesina and Giuliano
(2010, 2011, 2014) who empirically investigate the impact of family ties on economic
outcomes. They find that strong family ties tend to create various inefficiencies
in the economy.5 Several papers explore the link between family ties and the
regulation of labor markets. Alesina et al. (2015) rationalize the observed correlation
between the intensity of family ties and employment protection by arguing that
agents in societies with strong family ties are less mobile and therefore choose
more regulated labor markets to avoid exploitation by monopsonic firms. Fogli
(2004) argues that in an economy with credit constrained young agents, these
choose to live at home longer in order to smooth consumption. Since consumption
inside the household has a public good component, labor market regulation that
increases the income of the old generation can be welfare improving and these
potential gains are larger in countries characterized by a larger family size. Neugart
(2008) analyzes how the size of intra-household transfers affects preferences for
employment protection legislation of those voters who are out-of-the labor force
3. See Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1998) for an essay collection of the most relevant papers on
the political economy of reform and Rodrik (1996) for a review of the literature. Alesina and
Giuliano (2014) survey recent work on the impact of family ties on economic outcomes.
4. Also see Drazen and Easterly (2001), Pitlik and Wirth (2003), Alesina et al. (2006) and Agnello
et al. (2015) for empirical papers in the field.
5. Daniele and Geys (2016) question whether family ties generally have a negative effect on
economic outcomes and show that this relation only holds for advanced economies. Ljunge
(2015) provides evidence that stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues that
might in turn lead to better functioning institutions and improved economic outcomes.
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but have an employed spouse. He finds that in countries where this voter group
is relatively large, labor regulation is comparatively strict. These papers differ
from our work in one crucial aspect. They analyze the relation between family ties
and the level of labor market regulation, independent of a country’s state of the
economy. We, however, focus on the question how the interaction of intra-family
altruism and the economic situation affects support for changes in labor market
regulation. Reher (1998) emphasizes the divide between central/northern Europe
and the Mediterranean region regarding the intensity of family ties. Bentolila
and Ichino (2008) build on this finding to show that intra-family transfers work as
unemployment insurance in southern Europe whereas northern European countries
rely on state provided insurance systems.
While this chapter is mainly a contribution to the political economy of reform, it
is also related to labor economics as it builds on insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck
and Snower, 1984, 1986, 2002). Bentolila et al. (2012) provide a detailed analysis of
labor market dualism in Spain which is the real-world labor market that motivates
our model. Di Cintio and Grassi (2015) show in an efficiency wage framework
where market dualism arises endogenously that hiring and firing restrictions in-
crease the use of flexible contracts and raise the wage differential. Gru¨ner (2013)
analyzes the sustainability of structural reforms in Spain and Italy within a political
economy framework and highlights the politically pivotal role of insider employees.
Finally, this chapter is related to the literature that tries to explain cross-country
differences in employment protection. Saint-Paul (2002) and Bru¨gemann (2012)
analyze models in which employment protection creates its own support. These
models give rise to multiple equilibria and can thus rationalize the cross country
differences in labor market policies.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the empirical observations
that motivate our work. The model setup is developed in Section 4.3. We then
derive the effect of altruism on reform support in Section 4.4 and analyze the
impact of wealth in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we discuss policy implications.
Section 4.7 concludes. The Appendix provides a detailed sensitivity analysis
and discussion of assumptions. Moreover, the Appendix reports details about
mathematical derivations and data sources.
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4.2 Motivating evidence
This section presents the empirical evidence that motivates this chapter. We first
describe the employment situation in the crisis countries since 2005 and then
present data showing that efforts to reform have been weak. Finally, we provide
evidence from the World Values Survey confirming that family ties in the affected
countries are strong.
The severe impact of the economic downturn since 2008 is most evident in labor
market data, especially for the age cohort 15–24. As shown in Figure 4.1, youth
unemployment has increased dramatically reaching rates around 40 percent in Italy
and Portugal and a staggering 56 percent in Spain, whereas it remained almost
stable in other euro area countries. The overall unemployment rates are critical,
too. The figures for 2014 are 12.7 percent, 14.1 percent, and 24.5 percent in Italy,
Portugal, and Spain, respectively.6 Besides this substantial rise in unemployment,
also the other outsider groups have significantly grown during the crisis. In Spain,
for instance, the share of involuntary part-time work in total employment rose from
4.3 percent in 2008 to 10.3 percent in 2014. The incidence of discouraged workers
increased from 1.0 percent in 2008 to 2.2 percent in 2013. Moreover, the share of
temporary employment rose among the youngest cohort (15-24 years) from 59.2
percent in 2008 to 69.1 percent in 2014. Similar developments can be observed in
Italy and Portugal.7
According to the crisis hypothesis, these dramatic figures should have triggered
comprehensive policy changes. However, reform efforts have been rather limited.
This lack of reform is reflected in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Labor Freedom
for the crisis countries. The index is mainly based on World Bank data and
measures labor market flexibility by considering various aspects of a country’s
legal and regulatory framework. It is measured on a scale between 0 and 100
where higher values indicate more flexibility (for a detailed description of the
index see the Appendix). To measure the change of labor market regulation over
the crisis years, we compare the index values for the pre-crisis year 2007 with the
data for 2014 (see Table 4.1 on page 59). Contrary to the prediction of the crisis
6. Data are taken from Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; accessed on 30 May 2015.
7. Data are taken from the OECD: https://stats.oecd.org; accessed on 5 November 2015.
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Figure 4.1: Youth unemployment in crisis countries 2005–2014
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Note: The lines ‘Average crisis’ and ‘Average non-crisis’ depict average youth unemploy-
ment rates of the crisis countries and of selected non-crisis countries (Finland, Germany
and the Netherlands), respectively.
Source: Eurostat.
hypothesis, values for Portugal have remained almost unaffected over this period
while the index value for Italy has decreased, implying an even stronger regulation
of labor markets. The Spanish index value has slightly increased during the crisis,
but Spain’s relative position within the comprehensive set of countries captured
by the index has decreased from rank 115 in 2007 to 127 in 2014. Moreover, in
a detailed evaluation of Spanish labor market policy during the crisis, Bentolila
et al. (2012) argue that ‘the extraordinary rise in unemployment in Spain since
2007 was insufficient to trigger labor market reform.’ Overall, the sharp increase in
youth unemployment in the crisis countries has not led to substantial labor market
reforms.
Why have these extremely high rates of youth unemployment not induced more
pressure to reform? Do these countries have a common characteristic which makes
the crisis hypothesis fail? Interestingly, one cultural attribute shared by southern
European countries is strong family ties. The important role of the family in these
countries has long been highlighted in the sociological literature (see Reher, 1998).
Alesina and Giuliano (2011) develop a quantitative measure of family ties based on
data from the World Values Survey. The crisis countries are all characterized by
strong family ties, especially compared to northern European countries (see Table
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Table 4.1: Family ties and labor market freedom in selected euro area countries
Family ties Labor market freedom
(in 2007 and 2014)
Crisis countries:
Italy 0.2 75; 55
Portugal 0.0 43; 43
Spain 0.1 50; 53
Non-crisis countries:
Finland -0.6 46; 55
Germany -0.7 46; 51
Netherlands -0.8 66; 66
Note: Strength of family ties is measured on a scale from -1 (weak) to 1 (strong); labor
market freedom is measured on a scale from 0 (strongly regulated) to 100 (mostly free).
Source: Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for family ties and Heritage Foundation (2015) for
labor market freedom.
4.1 for an overview of the index values and Appendix C for a detailed description
of the World Values Survey and the composition of the index).
Recent work suggests that family ties indeed have a significant impact on politico-
economic outcomes, for instance on political participation and economic growth
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, 2014). Moreover, and closely related to our work,
Bentolila and Ichino (2008) show that financial transfers within families are more
frequent in countries with strong family ties, especially when a household is hit
by unemployment. Hence, the role of the family as a mechanism for insuring
against unemployment appears to be particularly important in southern European
countries. Moreover, higher indirect transfers are also a result of family ties. A
survey by the ‘European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions’ (Eurofound, 2014) shows that, as a response to the poor employment
situation, in 2011 more young people lived with their parents than did in 2007,
with a more pronounced increase of co-residence in countries with strong family
ties.
This evidence suggests that family ties and the resulting transfers might play a
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role in determining support for reform. In the next section, we set up a simple
political economy model that investigates how family ties affect public support for
deregulatory labor market reforms in times of economic crisis. The model implies
that in the presence of strong family ties the median voter might not be in favor of
reforming a status quo characterized by strict labor market regulation and very
high (youth) unemployment — as witnessed in the crisis countries in the years
2010 to 2014.
4.3 The model
The economy is populated by a unit measure of agents who differ in their state of
employment: they are either insiders (i) or outsiders (o). Agents form families. A
family is composed of two agents who are linked via altruism. Hence, an agent
can be represented by a pair (j, j˜) where j ∈ {i, o} refers to the agent’s state of
employment and j˜ ∈ {i, o} to that of the other family member. This yields three
family types: insider families, outsider families, and mixed families. We denote the
fraction of insiders in the population by η and assume that the employment states
of two members of the same family are independent. We discuss this assumption
in Appendix A.1.5.
4.3.1 Preferences
The preferences of agents are represented by the following utility function:
u(cj, j˜)− 1{j=i}d + α
(
u(c j˜,j)− 1{ j˜=i}d
)
,
where (j, j˜) represents the agent’s type, cj, j˜ his consumption and c j˜j denotes the
other family member’s consumption. Parameter α measures an agent’s altruistic
link to his or her family member, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Moreover, u(cj, j˜) is of the
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) type with risk-aversion parameter γ:
u(cj, j˜) = (c
1−γ
j, j˜
)/(1− γ).
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We assume that being an insider is associated with effort that causes disutility d. As
we normalize the disutility of being an outsider to zero, the parameter d effectively
reflects the difference in effort between insiders and outsiders.8 For the main part
of our analysis we do not need to assume a lower bound on d.9 In contrast, note
that we have to impose an upper bound d on d to ensure that agents always prefer
to be insiders rather than outsiders.
Each agent’s budget constraint comprises the following elements. Insiders earn
ei, which is normalized to one: ei = 1. Outsiders receive eo satisfying 0 < eo < ei.
Besides income, agents can also finance consumption through wealth w. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that there is no heterogeneity among agents with respect to
wealth. Agents can transfer resources to their family member where tj, j˜ represents
the net transfer agent j receives from his or her family member. These three income
sources are disposable to the agents, so the budget constraint of agent (j, j˜) reads
ej + w + tj, j˜ = cj, j˜.
4.3.2 Labor market and reform
The effects of deregulating labor market reforms have been extensively studied (see,
among others, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Saint-Paul, 1993, 1995, 2004, Bentolila
et al., 2012 and Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2014). A prime example of
such a reform is a reduction of employment protection, for instance, a lowering of
firing costs. Such a reform makes hirings more attractive for two reasons: First,
via the direct channel of lowering the expected cost of future firings. Second, via
the indirect effect of reducing workers’ bargaining power and thereby putting
downward pressure on wages. Thus, the reform tends to increase employment,
yet at the cost of lower wages and/or greater risk of job loss for the established
8. To simplify the analysis, we assume a ‘representative’ outsider with constant eo and d = 0.
In reality, income and work effort are not constant among outsiders since these comprise a
heterogeneous group of agents composed of the unemployed, the underemployed and workers
in the low-wage sector. The working outsiders dispose of higher income than the unemployed
but have less leisure and vice versa. Still, on average, insiders are likely to work more and enjoy
less leisure than outsiders which speaks in favor of assuming d > 0.
9. Assuming d < 0 could be interpreted as an additional utility gap (beyond the wage gap) between
insiders and outsiders arising from, for example, social stigma.
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insiders. This nexus leads to a conflict between insiders and outsiders over reform:
improved access to the labor market for outsiders comes at the price of reduced
wages and/or lower job security for insiders.
To focus on the interaction of altruism and voting behavior, we do not model the
labor market explicitly but rather take the above mentioned effects of labor market
reform as given. We denote the share of insiders before voting on reform by the
parameter η and the change in the insider share following reform by ∆η > 0. The
change of insider wages through reform is given by ∆ei ≤ 0, where eo ≤ ei + ∆ei
ensures that insider wages are never below outsider wages. Labor market flexibility
is represented by the parameter f, with 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, that captures the likelihood of job
turnover in the absence of reform. At the extremes, agents either remain in their
state of employment for sure in case of a completely rigid labor market ( f = 0). Or,
for f = 1, the probability of becoming an insider in the next period is independent
of an agent’s employment status ex ante. In general terms, the probability of
remaining an insider if reform is not implemented is pni = 1− f (1− η). As a
consequence, the probability for an outsider to become an insider in the absence
of reform is now given by pno = f η — as the two probabilities have to satisfy
pni η + p
n
o (1− η) = η. Here, and in the following, the probability of becoming an
insider is denoted by p, where the subscript indicates the agent’s employment
status ex ante and the superscript denotes whether reform is implemented (r) or
the status quo is preserved (n).
The change of labor market flexibility through reform is captured by the pa-
rameter ∆ f , where 0 ≤ ∆ f ≤ 1− f . If ∆ f = 0, reform has no impact on labor
turnover. Conversely, ∆ f = 1− f implies that all agents have the same probability
of becoming an insider ex post irrespective of their employment status ex ante.
In general, if reform is implemented, the probability of remaining an insider is
pri = 1− ( f + ∆ f )(1− (η + ∆η)). The probability of an outsider to become an
insider is given by pro = (( f + ∆ f )(1− η − ∆η)η + ∆η)/(1− η). Formally, the
implementation of reform has the following effects. First, the labor market becomes
more flexible (∆ f ≥ 0), insider wages decrease (∆ei ≤ 0) and the insider share in
the economy increases (∆η > 0). The share of insiders after reform hence becomes
η+ ∆η. The reduction of insider wages and a higher risk of job loss are the sources
of the insiders’ opposition to reform.
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Table 4.2: Overview of the model’s parameters
Description Parameter Range Section 4.4
Agent characteristics:
Altruism α [0, 1] 0 and 1
Risk aversion γ [0,∞) 0
Disutility of an insider job d (−∞, d) (−∞, d)
Wealth w (−eo,∞) (−eo,∞)
Labor market characteristics:
Insider share ex ante η [0, 1) [0, 1)
Insider income ex ante ei 1 1
Outsider income eo (0, 1) (0, 1)
Labor market flexibility ex ante f [0, 1] 0
Reform characteristics:
Change of insider share ∆η (0, 1− η] (0, 1− η]
Change of insider income ∆ei [eo − ei, 0] (eo + d− 1, 0)
Change of labor market flexibility ∆ f [0, 1− f ] 0
Note: The last column provides the parameter values assumed in Section 4.4. More general
cases are considered in Section 4.5 and Appendix A.1.
In the following, we only focus on the effect of a decreased insider wage (∆ei < 0)
and assume that job security remains unaffected (∆ f = 0). In Appendix A.1 we
consider several cases with ∆ f > 0 (some with ∆ei < 0 and others with ∆ei = 0).
For all these parameterizations, we obtain the same qualitative results as in our
baseline scenario where reform only reduces insider wages but does not decrease
job security for insiders. Thus, focusing on only one of these effects simplifies the
analysis without affecting the qualitative results of the analysis.
To focus on the role of family ties, we make a further strong assumption: We set
f = 0, that is agents remain in their state of employment for sure in the absence of
reform. In combination with ∆ f = 0, we obtain f + ∆ f = 0, which implies that all
insiders keep their jobs for sure after reform (pri = 1). The additional insider jobs
generated by the reform are distributed among the former outsiders which implies
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that the probability for an outsider to become an insider after reform is pro =
∆η/(1− η). In Appendix A.1-A.4, we show in a comprehensive sensitivity analysis
that relaxing these strong assumptions made on the labor market characteristics
does not change our results qualitatively. Table 4.2 summarizes all parameters of
the model. We have to set the above mentioned upper bound d = u(ei + ∆ei +
w)− u(eo + w) to ensure that, in the absence of altruism (α = 0, and thus tj, j˜ = 0),
agents always (also after reform) prefer to be insiders rather than outsiders, which
requires u(ei + ∆ei + w)− d > u(eo + w).
4.3.3 Voting on reform
Agents are in favor of reform whenever the expected utility of reform exceeds the
utility in the absence of reform:
Ur
(j, j˜) = (1− prj)(1− prj˜)(1+ α)u(co,o) + (1− prj)prj˜(u(co,i) + α(u(ci,o)− d))
+prj(1− prj˜)(u(ci,o)− d + αu(co,i)) + prj prj˜(1+ α)(u(ci,i)− d)
≥
Un
(j, j˜) = u(cj, j˜)− 1{j=i}d + α(u(c j˜,j)− 1{ j˜=i}d).
where Ur
(j, j˜) represents the expected utility from reform and U
n
(j, j˜) denotes the utility
in case of no reform for an agent who is of type (j, j˜). Under the assumptions
made above the respective probabilities become pri = 1 and p
r
o = ∆η/(1− η).
The decision whether reform is implemented or rejected depends on the political
process. We apply majority vote: reform is implemented if and only if
∑
j∈{i,o}
∑
j˜∈{i,o}
1{Ur
(j, j˜) ≥ Un(j, j˜)}µ(j, j˜) ≥ 0.5,
where µ(j, j˜) represents the share of agents with characteristics (j, j˜). The descrip-
tion of the voting scheme completes the model’s politico-economic environment.
The median voter framework is the natural modeling choice in our setup, as
we consider voting on a single reform with given characteristics. Faced with such
a binary choice, even the multiple parties in a political system of proportional
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representation — as in the southern European countries that motivate our analysis
— would just split into two blocks: supporters and opponents to reform.
4.4 Family ties and economic reform
We now turn to the analysis of the model. In order to carve out the interaction
between altruism, state of employment, and voting behavior as clearly as possible,
we first consider risk neutral agents (γ = 0). Risk neutrality rules out any effects of
wealth so we can set w = 0.
We begin the analysis by looking at the two extreme values of the altruism
parameter: on the one hand, a complete absence of altruism (α = 0), which we call
the ‘individualistic case’, on the other hand the ‘completely altruistic case’ (α = 1).
Then, we explore voting behavior under ‘incomplete altruism’ (0 < α < 1).
4.4.1 Individualistic case: α = 0
First, note that the individualistic scenario of course implies that there are no
transfers between family members, tj, j˜ = 0. Agents are exclusively concerned with
their own expected state of employment when it comes to the decision whether to
vote in favor of or against reform. The outsider votes in favor of reform if and only
if
Uro = p
r
o(u(ei + ∆ei)− d) + (1− pro)u(eo) ≥ u(eo) = Uno .
From the assumption that d < d = u(ei + ∆ei) − u(eo) it follows directly that
Uro > Uno . Hence, an outsider always prefers reform. Conversely, as ∆ei < 0, an
insider is always in favor of the status quo:
Uni = u(ei)− d > u(ei + ∆ei)− d = Uri .
Thus, all outsiders vote in favor of reform and all insiders vote against reform.
Since we assume majority vote, the implementation of reform only depends on
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whether the median voter is an insider or an outsider. This yields the following
result.
Lemma 1. Suppose α = 0. Then reform is implemented if and only if there are more
outsiders than insiders (i.e. iff η < 0.5).
To interpret this result recall that the outsider share 1− η is not the unemploy-
ment rate but also includes the underemployed, workers in the low-wage sector
and employees with jobs characterized by low levels of protection. Hence, the out-
sider share can be much larger than the unemployment rate and can even exceed
50 percent in times of economic downturn (see Dolado et al., 2002 and Bentolila et
al., 2012). The simple finding stated in Lemma 1 is in line with the rationale of the
crisis hypothesis: reform will only be implemented if a sufficiently large share of
the population suffers from the institutional rigidities of the labor market. We now
turn to the question of how voting behavior changes in the presence of altruism.
First, we analyze the case of complete altruism (α = 1).
4.4.2 Completely altruistic case: α = 1
In the case of complete altruism, the individual optimization problem becomes a
‘family problem’ since each agent weighs the well-being of both family members
equally. Therefore, the altruistic family ‘speaks with one voice’ — that is to say,
there is never disagreement and both members vote either in favor of or against
reform. Importantly, this is also true when family members are in different states
of employment — in contrast to the individualistic case in which members of the
same family cast opposing votes on reform if their job status differs.
We first analyze the voting decision of families in which both members are in
the same state of employment. Since members of these families are identical, their
decision follows the same reasoning as that of their individualistic counterparts.
Lemma 2. Families in which both members are outsiders (insiders) vote in favor of
(against) reform.
We can now derive the levels of the insider share η at which these families are
median voters. Recall that the employment states of two members of the same
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family are assumed to be independent. Therefore, the share of insider families
among all families is η2. Consequently, if η2 > 1/2, i.e. η > 1/
√
2, the median
voter is the insider family, and reform is blocked. Symmetrically, if η < 1− 1/√2
the median voter is the outsider family and reform is implemented. These results
imply that at the extremes of the employment spectrum the majority vote in the
completely altruistic case is similar to the individualistic case.
The interesting interval is the one between these regions. In this interval the
median voter is the mixed family which votes in favor of reform if and only if
(1− pro)[2u(
ei + ∆ei + eo
2
)− d] + pro2[u(ei + ∆ei)− d]
≥
2u(
ei + eo
2
)− d.
(3)
In the risk neutral case, this simplifies to
pro(ei + ∆ei − eo − d) ≥ −∆ei,
where the expression on the left-hand side of the equation represents the mixed
family’s expected gain from reform and the term on the right-hand side captures
the loss due to lower wage of the insider family member. Since pro = ∆η/(1− η),
this is equivalent to η ≥ 1+ (∆η/∆ei)(ei + ∆ei − eo − d).
The voting decision of the mixed family hence depends on η. It votes in favor
of reform only if the probability of becoming an insider for the outsider family
member is sufficiently high. We denote the value of η that stipulates this probability
reform threshold τ (recall that pro = ∆η/(1− η)).
Lemma 3. If α = 1 and γ = 0, the mixed family votes in favor of reform if and only if
η ≥ τ = 1+ (∆η/∆ei)(ei + ∆ei − eo − d).
Hence, in contrast to the individualistic case, it is possible that the outsider
member of the mixed family votes against reform. Only if η ≥ τ, the mixed family
is willing to accept the wage loss in exchange for improved job perspectives for
the outsider family member. Otherwise the mixed family prefers to maintain the
status quo. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, Proposition 4 directly follows.
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Proposition 4. If α = 1 and γ = 0, reform is implemented if and only if η ∈ [0, 1−
1/
√
2] ∪ [τ, 1/√2], where τ = 1+ (∆η/∆ei)(ei + ∆ei − eo − d).
Thus, Proposition 4 entails that there is a non-monotone relation between η and
the majority vote on reform if and only if τ ∈ (1− 1/√2, 1/√2), which implies
the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. If α = 1 and γ = 0, there is a non-monotone relation between the
insider share η and the majority vote on reform if and only if ∆η(ei + ∆ei − eo − d) ∈(
∆ei · (1− 1/
√
2),∆ei · 1/
√
2
)
.
The term ∆η(ei + ∆ei − eo − d) is the aggregate gain of outsiders through reform,
while the terms ∆ei · (1− 1/
√
2) and ∆ei · 1/
√
2 are equal to the aggregate loss of
insiders through reform at the bounds of the region where mixed families are the
median voters. Thus, Proposition 5 implies that the non-monotonicity result holds
if and only if the gain of outsiders through reform is bigger than the insiders’ loss
when there are very few insiders and smaller than the insiders’ loss when there
are many insiders. If this is not the case, non-monotonicity simply breaks down
because the characteristics of the reform are either extremely positive or extremely
negative implying that mixed families are always in favor of or against reform,
respectively, no matter how large the share of insiders. A reform that satisfies
the condition in Proposition 5 can nevertheless improve welfare substantially. For
values of η close to 1− 1/√2 the gain for outsiders can be more than twice as large
as the loss for insiders. Moreover, the welfare implications of reform would be
even more positive if the effects on employers/capitalists were included. Figure 4.2
graphically compares the results of the individualistic and the completely altruistic
cases.
The main conclusion is that altruistic links can have a significant impact on
voting behavior. On the one hand, a relatively bad employment situation does not
induce, but rather prevents reform (for η ∈ [1− 1/√2, τ]). On the other hand, a
majority of the population is in favor of reform when the employment situation is
relatively good (for η ∈ [τ, 1/√2]).
When relating our model to the motivating example of the southern European
crisis countries, the most interesting case is clearly η ∈ [1− 1/√2, τ], when reform
is blocked at low insider shares. If one takes into account that the group of outsiders,
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Figure 4.2: Reform decision as a function of the insider share η
Reform No reform Reform No reform η
0 1− 1/√2 τ 1/√2 1
Reform No reform
0 1/2 1
η
Comparison of the individualistic case (lower graph) and the completely altruistic case
(upper graph).
besides the unemployed, also comprises temporary employed and underemployed
workers, the insider share in these countries easily goes below τ-values of around
50 percent (see Bentolila et al., 2012). Moreover, as we show in the Appendix, the
reform threshold τ can, depending on parameter values, be well above 0.5, which
means that reform blockage (by altruistic mixed families) can occur at outsider
shares far below 50 percent.
The reform threshold τ depends on various parameters. For illustration purposes,
we now stipulate concrete values for the relevant parameters. We set eo = 1/3,
d = 0.1 and ∆η = 0.05 and let the crucial parameter ∆ei vary.10 Figure 4.3 shows
how τ, and thus the majority vote on reform, changes in reaction to the variation
in ∆ei. In the red/dark regions reform is rejected, while it is accepted in the
green/light regions. Dashed lines indicate a change in the family types that are the
median voters: from left to right the median voters are first the outsider families
10. We assume in the baseline scenario that an outsider disposes of one third of insiders’ income.
As the group of outsiders is very heterogeneous, this parameter is difficult to match to the
data. One reasonable proxy might be the ratio of minimum relative to average wages of full-
time workers, which is very close to one third in Spain and Portugal (according to OECD:
https://stats.oecd.org, accessed on 5 November 2015). Moreover, unemployment benefits are
comparably low in the crisis countries and hence are unlikely to substantially increase the
average outsider wage. The preference parameter d, which measures the disutility arising from
the workload of an insider job, is also hard to pin down. We consider a value corresponding
to 10 percent of the insider wage to be a sensible assumption. This might appear low at a
first glance, however, it also reflects that insider jobs are associated with prestige whereas
outsiders are often socially disadvantaged. Finally, the parameters ∆η and ∆ei depend on how
comprehensive the reform is. In the baseline scenario, we set ∆η = 0.05 and let ∆ei vary to
analyze how this affects the support for reform by the mixed family.
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Figure 4.3: Majority vote as a function of the change of insider wage and of the
insider share
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Note: Parameter values are eo = 1/3, d = 0.1 and ∆η = 0.05. Green/light regions indicate
majority support for reform, while red/dark regions indicate rejection.
(o,o), then the (completely altruistic) mixed families, and finally insider families.
The solid line is the mixed family’s indifference curve. Figure 4.3 illustrates that
the larger is the decrease of the insider wage following reform, the higher must be
η to compensate the mixed family for the income reduction (i.e. the better must be
the chance ∆η/(1− η) for the outsider to become an insider after reform). This is
intuitive: As the reform becomes less attractive, the region where it is supported
shrinks.
We have derived the above findings within a very stylized model to make the
basic mechanism that reverses the crisis hypothesis as clear as possible. In the
following, we show that our result still holds if some strong assumptions are
relaxed. First, we consider the case of incomplete altruism (0 < α < 1). Then, in
Section 4.5, we show that in the presence of risk aversion and wealth the results
also hold and can become even stronger. Appendix A.1 demonstrates that relaxing
our assumptions made on the labor market and the considered reform does not
qualitatively change our results. Higher f and ∆η decrease the reform threshold,
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while a higher ∆ f increases the reform threshold. Finally, note that by assuming
the benefit of reform to be an increase in insider jobs ∆η and the cost to be a
reduction ∆ei in wages for η insiders, we stipulate that the net social benefit of
reform ∆η(ei + ∆ei − eo − d)− η∆ei is increasing in the outsider share 1− η. Thus,
by assumption, there is an element in the model that works in favor of the crisis
hypothesis. However, we have shown that the crisis hypothesis nevertheless breaks
down due to the impact of family ties. In Appendix A.1.4 we show that this is still
true if the net social benefit of reform is increasing even faster in the outsider share,
in particular when reform creates more jobs in case the outsider share is high (i.e.
when ∆η is a decreasing function of η).
4.4.3 Incomplete altruism: 0 < α < 1
So far, we have looked only at the two extreme cases of the altruism parameter
α. The median voter’s choice strongly differs between the two cases. Naturally,
the question arises how this choice changes when we move from one extreme to
the other.11 Appendix B derives the answer to this question analytically. Figure
4.4 graphically illustrates the results for the following parameter values: eo = 1/3,
d = 0.1, ∆ei = −0.05 and ∆η = 0.05. Again, dashed lines indicate a change in the
family types that are the median voters: from left to right the median voters are
first the outsider families (o,o), then outsiders within mixed families (o,i), then
insiders in such families (i,o), and finally insider families (i,i). Solid lines indicate
the indifference lines of (o,i) and (i,o) members of mixed families. Going from
the bottom to the top of Figure 4.4, we can see how the reform decision changes
as the altruism parameter increases from zero to one. For low values of altruism,
the decision is exactly as in the individualistic case. However, at a certain level of
altruism (α ≈ 0.55) the insiders within mixed families start to favor reform even
for η-values where they are the median voters (η ≤ 1/√2). Similarly, there is a
point (α ≈ 0.73) at which the outsiders of mixed families start to oppose reform
11. Another alternative to relax our assumption is to consider one-sided altruism only. Suppose
insider parents are altruistic towards their outsider children, but not vice versa. In this situation
the mechanism we describe is weakened as the children are not interested in their parents’
consumption anymore, but still present, because children still receive transfers from their
parents.
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Figure 4.4: Majority vote as a function of altruism and insider share for ∆η = 0.05
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Note: Green/light regions indicate majority support for reform, while red/dark regions
indicate rejection.
even for η-values where they are the median voters (η ≥ 1− 1/√2). In this case
the small chance for the outsider to obtain an insider job is not worth incurring the
wage reduction for the insider family member. Both these regions become bigger
as altruistic links become stronger, until the case of complete altruism is reached.
The upshot of this sensitivity analysis is as follows. First, moderately reducing
the altruism parameter below one does not alter the qualitative findings: the crisis
hypothesis still fails. Secondly, however, with low but positive levels of altruism, the
majority vote does not differ at all from the individualistic case. Combined, these
two findings suggest that two countries, even if they do not strongly differ with
respect to the intensity of family ties, might qualitatively differ in their aptitude to
embrace reform. For instance, in a country with altruism parameter 0.8 reform is
blocked for a certain range of low insider shares, while in a country with altruism
parameter 0.7 reform is implemented for all insider shares below fifty percent.
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Table 4.3: Reform threshold as a function of the degree of risk aversion
Risk aversion γ Reform threshold τ
0 48.3
1 55.2
2 61.0
3 65.9
4 69.9
Note: Parameter values are eo = 1/3, w = 0, d = 0.1, ∆η = 0.05 and ∆ei = −0.05. A higher
reform threshold implies a larger region of η-values for which reform is blocked.
4.5 The role of wealth
In this section we analyze how wealth as an additional source of intra-family
transfers affects support for reform. This aspect is relevant for the crisis countries
since these have a relatively high level of median net wealth. The ECB’s Eurosys-
tem Household Finance and Consumption Network (2013) reports median net
household wealth in Italy, Portugal, and Spain of 173.5ke, 75.2ke, and 182.7ke
respectively, compared to 85.8ke, 51.4ke, and 103.6ke respectively in Finland,
Germany, and the Netherlands.12 Therefore, we now allow for risk-averse agents
(γ > 0) to study wealth effects. Additionally, we set α = 1 to explore the relation
between altruism and risk aversion as clearly as possible and to keep the analysis
simple. How does risk aversion affect the voting decisions of agents within the
pivotal mixed family? To answer this question, we have to consider Equation 3 on
page 67, and solve for the reform threshold τ which represents the level of η at
which the mixed family is indifferent between voting in favor of or against reform.
If risk aversion is a small natural number, we can obtain an analytical solution for
τ (see Appendix B). Table 4.3 summarizes how the reform threshold τ changes as
a reaction to an increase in risk aversion.
Higher risk aversion leads to an increase of the threshold τ which implies a
12. Controlling for household size reduces the difference between southern and northern European
countries, yet only marginally (see the ECB’s Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption
Network, 2013).
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Figure 4.5: Reform threshold as a function of wealth w
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Note: Parameter values are γ = 2, eo = 1/3, d = 0.1, ∆ei = −0.05 and ∆η = 0.05.
reduced support for reform. The more risk averse agents are, the better must be the
post-reform job perspectives to make the mixed family accept a reduction of the
insider member’s income. This result is intuitive as we would expect risk averse
agents to oppose reform more strongly than risk neutral ones.
We now turn to the role of wealth. Under risk neutrality, wealth w has no effect.
In the following, we show that this is not the case under risk aversion, which we
set equal to γ = 2. The effect of wealth is ambiguous. On the one hand, wealth
provides insurance against the worst case outcome of reform, namely that the
outsider family member remains an outsider while the insider’s wage is reduced.
In this case, a wealthy family can still maintain a decent level of consumption.
Ceteris paribus, this insurance effect decreases the reform threshold τ. On the other
hand, wealth decreases the marginal utility of consumption and thus changes the
trade-off between a higher income from an insider job and the associated higher
disutility of work. While we only consider parameter choices where agents prefer
to be insiders rather than outsiders, the utility margin by which they prefer to
be insiders decreases with their wealth. This effect puts upward pressure on the
reform threshold when wealth increases.
In Figure 4.5, we plot the overall effect of wealth on the reform threshold for
d = 0.1, eo = 1/3, ∆ei = −0.05 and ∆η = 0.05. The first effect initially shifts
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the reform threshold of the mixed family slightly down indicating an increasing
support for reform. Once the second effect dominates, the reform threshold is
shifted up illustrating a reduced willingness of the mixed family to support reform.
In conclusion, we find that high levels of wealth can reinforce our core mecha-
nism: if outsider members of a mixed family can increase their consumption not
only due to transfers from the wage income of insider family members but also
from dissaving family assets, then the parameter region in which reform is blocked
becomes even bigger. In light of this theoretical finding one might conjecture that
the high median household wealth in the crisis countries has contributed to the
observed reform fatigue. However, the strength of this effect could only be properly
assessed in a dynamic setup, in which the length of unemployment spells and the
process of dissaving wealth are both explicitly modeled.
Throughout this section, we have assumed an equal distribution of wealth among
agents. An interesting effect can occur when we allow for wealth inequality. First,
suppose a situation in which all agents’ wealth equals the value where the reform
threshold reaches its minimum in Figure 4.5. Now consider a case with the same
total wealth, but unequally distributed: there would be poorer families to the left
and wealthier families to the right of the minimum. Both are less supportive of
reform than without inequality. As a consequence, overall support for reform
decreases.
4.6 Policy implications
In this section we discuss policy implications of our main results from Sections IV
and V, respectively.
4.6.1 Austerity and reform
The main conclusion from Section 4.4 is that, in the presence of intra-family
altruism, crisis might hinder rather than facilitate economic reform — a finding
that casts doubt on the crisis hypothesis. This finding yields an interesting policy
implication regarding the effect of austerity in countries with strong family ties.
According to the crisis hypothesis, austerity measures that aggravate an economic
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downturn could have a positive employment effect via the indirect channel of
facilitating labor market reforms. Along these lines, Drazen and Grilli (1993, p. 598)
argue that ‘crises may raise welfare if they are the only way to induce necessary
policy changes.’ In contrast, our model shows that the consequences of austerity
can be quite different when family ties are taken into account. In the presence of
intra-family altruism an economic slump does not lead to employment-promoting
reforms, but rather causes reform blockage and redistribution of resources from
insider family members to outsider members. As can be seen in Figure 4.2 on page
69, a crisis reduces the willingness to reform in a range of the insider share where
the individualistic case predicts reform. In contrast, stimulating the economy might
encourage reform where the benchmark predicts blockage. Note, however, that this
effect depends on the characteristics of the economy and the reform: Proposition
5 states that for reforms that are less attractive for the mixed family (namely,
τ > 1/
√
2), family ties simply expand the region where reform is rejected, but do
not imply support for reform in case of relatively good economic circumstances.
Our finding suggests that countries with different degrees of family ties might
require diverging policy prescriptions to successfully induce economic reforms in
times of crisis.
4.6.2 Wealth, inequality, and reform
The core result of Section 4.5 is that wealth matters for the mixed family’s voting
decision on reform. As wealth increases, becoming an insider is less attractive since
the utility gain of consuming the additional income is decreasing, while the utility
loss of having less leisure remains the same. Hence, a high level of wealth can lead
to reform fatigue, an aspect that might be relevant for the crisis countries where
median net wealth is comparatively high (see, for instance, ECB, 2013).
Furthermore, we argue in Section 4.5 that resistance to reform might be even
stronger if wealth is unequally distributed. On the one hand, poor mixed families
oppose reform more strongly because they lack a wealth buffer that alleviates
the worst case outcome of reform (a wage cut for the insider and no transition
to insider status for the outsider). On the other hand, for the wealthy mixed
families the perspective of both members becoming insiders is less attractive as
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their marginal utility of additional income is relatively low. Therefore, in the
presence of strong family ties, substantial wealth inequality can reinforce resistance
to reform — redistributive policies, in contrast, have the potential to diminish
reform blockage.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes how family ties affect support for economic reform in times
of crisis. We make a theoretical contribution to the literature on the political
economy of reform by casting doubt on the crisis hypothesis, which states an
inverse relation between the state of an economy and support for reform. Taking
intra-family altruism into account can reduce support for reform in an economic
crisis. Furthermore, our theoretical findings hint at a potentially important policy
implication: austerity measures might block rather than foster economic reforms
if applied to countries where family ties are strong. Our model provides an ex-
planation for the limited reform progress in several southern European countries
during and following the Great Recession.13 Of course, other mechanisms also
play a role in creating opposition to labor market reform in the crisis countries.
For instance, as older workers are both more likely to have a permanent contract
and to be unionized, labor unions might oppose reform despite high youth unem-
ployment (see Blanchflower, 2006, and Boeri and Jimeno, 2015). Another reason
for reform blockage in the crisis countries might be that their political systems are
mainly characterized by proportional representation, which requires cross-party
compromises that might impede reform implementation (see, for instance, Persson
and Tabellini, 2000).
Although we focus on labor market reform, the underlying mechanism of our
model might also be relevant for other policy fields. For instance, the reform
of a pay-as-you-go social security system that aims to ease the financial burden
13. Note, however, that some reform efforts have been made in the crisis countries, in particular in
Spain in 2012 and Italy in 2014 (see OECD, 2013 and OECD, 2015, respectively). To the extent that
labor market reforms have been implemented in the crisis countries, the mechanism described
in our model suggests an explanation why these reforms have not been more comprehensive
and why they have been significantly delayed despite massive pressure by the EU and the IMF
(see, for instance, Bentolila et al., 2012).
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on the young might be opposed by the latter if they receive transfers from their
parents. Tabellini (2000) and Hansson and Stuart (1989) have considered a similar
idea by arguing that intergenerational altruism leads to a willingness of the young
to pay for the old. Our mechanism gives this story a new twist as the young
prefer maintaining the system, in particular in times of crisis, because they expect
transfers from the old. Another example is public sector reform. Many societies
maintain inefficiently large and costly public sectors which is puzzling from a
theoretical point of view (see the discussion in Acemoglu et al., 2011). According
to our argument, it is especially difficult to reform such a public sector during
an economic downturn if many voters are altruistically linked to state employees.
Voters who would demand a reform that reduces an inflated public bureaucracy in
the absence of altruism might oppose it if they can expect transfers from public
sector employees.
In this chapter, we have chosen a static approach to present the mechanism
relating family ties and reform support as clearly as possible. However, consid-
ering a dynamic setup would allow to address further important aspects like
intergenerational conflicts, short-run versus long-run effects, and sustainability of
reform.
This work is a first step toward understanding how family ties affect a country’s
tendency to reform. Further work — both theoretical and empirical — is needed to
develop a more detailed understanding of this relation.
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A.1 Labor market and support for reform
Our baseline model in Section 4.4 is highly stylized for illustration purposes. In
this Appendix we relax some of the assumptions previously made regarding the
labor market setup, namely f = 0, and ∆ f = 0. We show that the model’s results
remain qualitatively unaffected when these values are changed.1 To keep the
analysis tractable, we continue to assume complete altruism and risk neutrality
throughout this section. From the analysis in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we know that
the first assumption (α = 1) strengthens the results while the second one (γ = 0)
weakens them.
When we give up the assumptions made on f and ∆ f , the mixed family votes in
favor of reform if and only if
(1− pri )(1− pro)2u(eo) + (pri (1− pro) + (1− pri )pro)(2u(
ei + ∆ei + eo
2
)− d)+
pri p
r
o2(u(ei + ∆ei)− d)
≥
(1− pni )(1− pno )2u(eo) + (pni (1− pno ) + (1− pni )pro)(2u(
ei + eo
2
)− d)+
pni p
n
o 2(u(ei)− d),
where the probabilities pri , p
r
o, pni , and p
n
o are given in Section 4.3. In the following
Subsections A.1.1 and A.1.2 we illustrate how our results change when we vary
1. Of course, our main result trivially breaks down when ∆ei = 0 and ∆ f = 0, as there is no
disadvantage of reform in this case and therefore no reason for any voter to oppose reform. If,
however, either ∆ei is substantially below zero or ∆ f is substantially above zero, then our main
finding is robust to changes of these and the other parameters.
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Table A.1: Reform threshold as a function of ex ante labor market flexibility
f ∆ f Reform threshold τ
0 0 48.3
10 0 47.9
20 0 47.1
30 0 45.4
Note: All numbers in percent. Parameter values are eo = 1/3, d = 0.1, ∆ei = −0.05 and
∆η = 0.05. A higher reform threshold implies a larger region of η-values for which reform
is blocked.
f and ∆ f separately (keeping the other parameter at its previous value) and
also maintaining our assumptions on the remaining parameters: ∆ei = −0.05,
∆η = 0.05, eo = 1/3, and d = 0.1. In A.1.3 we consider scenarios in which we
jointly vary all parameters of the model. In A.1.4 we relax the assumption that the
impact of reform on ∆ei and ∆η does not depend on the insider share η. Finally, in
A.1.5 we verbally discuss one further assumption of our model, namely that the
job market states of two family members are independent of each other.
A.1.1 Labor market flexibility ex ante
The results in Section 4.4 are derived for f = 0 which means that all agents maintain
their state of employment if reform is not implemented. Table A.1 illustrates how
support for reform changes if we allow for labor market flexibility in the absence
of reform. When raising f we keep the assumption that ∆ f = 0. The mixed
family’s objection to reform decreases slightly with increasing ex ante labor market
flexibility. The intuition for this result is straightforward: the reason why agents
vote against reform is to protect the high insider income. If this income is at risk
anyway, even in the absence of reform, resistance against reform decreases as the
potential gain associated with reform relatively outweighs the cost.
80
Appendix to Chapter 4
Table A.2: Reform threshold as a function of the change in labor market flexibility
f ∆ f Reform threshold τ
0 0 48.3
0 25 49.5
0 50 49.7
0 100 49.8
Note:All numbers in percent. Parameter values are eo = 1/3, d = 0.1, ∆ei = −0.05 and
∆η = 0.05. A higher reform threshold implies a larger region of η-values for which reform
is blocked.
A.1.2 Change in labor market flexibility
In Section 4.4, we assume that insiders keep their job for sure in case of reform
(that is, f + ∆ f = 0). Table A.2 shows that relaxing this assumption (while keeping
f = 0) does not change the qualitative implications of the model. However, the
mixed family’s support for reform is weaker the stronger is the impact of reform
on labor market flexibility. The reason is that ∆ f > 0 introduces a second cost of
reform: the insider might lose his job. While a higher ∆ f at the same time increases
the outsider’s chance to find a job, the impact on the job perspectives of the insider
tends to dominate and the reform threshold therefore increases in ∆ f .
A.1.3 Sensitivity for various parameter combinations
Table A.3 on page 82 displays values of the reform threshold for different combi-
nations of the parameters f, ∆ f , ∆ei and ∆η, while we keep eo = 1/3 and d = 0.1.
The results show that the reversal of the crisis hypothesis holds for all these combi-
nations: The region in which the mixed family rejects reform does not disappear,
formally τ ∈ [1− 1/√2, 1/√2], irrespective of the chosen parameter combinations.
The influence of f and ∆ f on the reform threshold is as in the extreme cases
considered in A.1.1 and A.1.2, respectively.
A higher ∆η pushes the reform threshold considerably to the left, thereby
reducing opposition to reform. This is intuitive as a reform leading to more jobs
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Table A.3: Reform threshold as a function of labor market characteristics
f ∆ f ∆ei ∆η Reform threshold τ
25 25 -3 3 49.2
25 25 -3 5 42.1
25 25 -5 3 57.1
25 25 -5 5 49.4
25 50 -3 3 49.6
25 50 -3 5 45.7
25 50 -5 3 53.7
25 50 -5 5 49.7
50 25 -3 3 49.1
50 25 -3 5 40.9
50 25 -5 3 58.4
50 25 -5 5 49.3
50 50 -3 3 49.6
50 50 -3 5 45.3
50 50 -5 3 54.1
50 50 -5 5 49.6
0 100 0 5 45.0
0 100 0 3 47.0
0 100 -3 5 47.8
0 100 -3 3 49.8
Note: All numbers in percent. Parameter values are eo = 1/3 and d = 0.1. A higher reform
threshold implies a larger region of η-values for which reform is blocked.
is obviously more attractive for voters. The opposite is true for ∆ei as already
discussed in Section 4.4.
We also consider the case where f = 0 and ∆ f = 1, i.e. there is no labor market
mobility without reform and perfect mobility in case of reform. In this scenario
our general result persists even if ∆ei = 0: The mixed family opposes reform (for
low enough η) only because of the risk of losing the insider job.
Finally, we analyze the sensitivity of our results with respect to the outsider
income and the disutility of the insider job. As Table A.4 on page 83 shows, the
reform threshold is an increasing function of both variables. The reason is that an
increase in any of the two variables makes the prospect to obtain an additional
insider job through reform less attractive for the mixed family.
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Table A.4: Reform threshold for varying outsider income and insider disutility
eo d Reform threshold τ
25 0 30
25 10 40
25 20 50
33.3 0 38.3
33.3 10 48.3
33.3 20 58.3
40 0 45
40 10 55
40 20 65
Note: All numbers in percent. Parameter values are ∆ f = 0, ∆ei = −0.05 and ∆η = 0.05. A
higher reform threshold implies a larger region of η-values for which reform is blocked.
A.1.4 Insider share and effects of reform
We assume in the baseline model that the impact of reform on ∆ei and ∆η does
not depend on the insider share η. Importantly, this setup implies that the net
social benefit of reform ∆η(ei + ∆ei − eo − d)− η∆ei is decreasing in the insider
share η, which works in favor of the crisis hypothesis and thus against our non-
monotonicity result. In other words, the baseline model is sufficient to demonstrate
that an increase in the insider share can have opposing implications for the welfare
effect of reform and the political support for reform — the first being decreasing
and the second increasing in η. However, it is certainly plausible that the impact of
a labor market reform on insider wages and the number of insider jobs depends
on η. If anything, ∆ei and ∆η should both be decreasing in η. While the first
effect would work in the direction of our non-monotonicity result, the second
would work in the opposite direction. We therefore now consider a modification
of the baseline setup where only this second effect is present, namely ∆η =
g(η) with g′(η) < 0. Following the derivation of Proposition 4, it is easy to
show that for α = 1, γ = 0, and 0 > g′(η) > ∆ei/(ei + ∆ei − eo − d), reform is
implemented if and only if η ∈ [0, 1− 1/√2] ∪ [τ, 1/√2], where τ is the solution
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to τ = 1+ (g(τ)/∆ei)(ei + ∆ei − eo − d). Thus, as long as ∆η does not decrease too
fast in η (for our baseline g′(η) >≈ −9.7 percent) ensuring that pro is still increasing
in η, the qualitative results of the baseline model remain unaffected. Moreover,
in a setup where both ∆η and ∆ei decrease in η, our non-monotonicity result can
hold even if pro is decreasing in η. Finally, note that in cases where the majority
vote under altruism is monotone in η, the voting behavior can nevertheless differ
substantially from the individualistic case. In particular, opposition to reform can
still be much stronger in the altruistic case.
A.1.5 Correlation of employment states
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the employment states of members of the
same family are uncorrelated. This assumption may seem oversimplifying, but we
think that it is not essential for the analysis. On the one hand, consider the extreme
of perfect positive correlation between the family members’ employment states. In
this case there would be no mixed families in the economy and altruism would
obviously have no effect on voting. On the other hand, assuming perfect negative
correlation implies that society is exclusively inhabited by mixed families who
then trivially become the median voter for all values of η. Apparently, these two
extremes seem to be irrelevant in reality. We think that in many societies, especially
those in a crisis situation, the mixed family does indeed play an important role. In
Spain, for instance, labor market dualism leads to a situation where many insider
parents have outsider children (see Bentolila et al., 2012).
A.2 Mathematical details
A.2.1 Incomplete altruism
In this section, we derive the results regarding incomplete altruism that are illus-
trated in Figure 4.4 on page 72. The location of the dashed lines indicating changes
in the median voter family types does not depend on altruism. The median voters
are first (o,o), then (o,i), then (i,o), and finally (i,i). In contrast, it is non-trivial to
derive the location of the solid lines that indicate the indifference lines of agents of
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types (o,i) and (i,o) – that is to say, outsider and insider members of mixed families.
Agents of type (o,i) vote in favor of reform if and only if
(1− pro) · (eo + α(ei + ∆ei − d)) + pro · (1+ α) · (ei + ∆ei − d)
≥ eo + α · (ei − d),
which simplifies (for the considered parameters eo = 1/3, d = 0.1, ∆ei = −0.05 and
∆η = 0.05) to η ≥ 1− 31/(60 · α). Thus, the indifference line of insider members
of mixed families, (o,i), is given by η = 1− 31/(60 · α).
Agents of type (i,o) vote in favor of reform if and only if
(1− pro) · (αeo + (ei + ∆ei − d)) + pro · (1+ α) · (ei + ∆ei − d)
≥ αeo + ei − d,
which simplifies to η ≥ 1− (31 · α)/60. Thus, the indifference line of outsider
members of mixed families, (o,i), is given by η = 1− (31 · α)/60.
A.2.2 Risk aversion
We now derive the results regarding the reform threshold under risk aversion that
are reported in Section 4.5. Observe that, for α = 1, consumption is equalized
across family members which simplifies the derivation considerably. The mixed
family is indifferent between reform and no reform if and only if:
(1− pro) ·
(
2u(
eo + ei + ∆ei + 2w
2
)− d
)
+ pro · 2u (ei + ∆ei + w− d)
=
2u(
eo + ei + 2w
2
)− d.
(A.1)
Plugging in pro = ∆η/(1− η), as well as eo = 1/3, w = 0, d = 0.1, ∆η = 0.05, ∆ei =
−0.05, and a value for γ, we can solve for η, which is the reform threshold. Table
4.3 on page 73 provides the results for several different risk-aversion parameters γ.
In Figure 4.5 on page 74 we plot the values of η that solve Equation A.1, when
γ = 2 and wealth w varies. The solution is given by the following function of
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wealth w:
η = (−41726− 39629w− 16260w2 − 7200w3)/(−68400− 72000w).
A.3 Data sources
A.3.1 Index of labor freedom
The description of the index is based on information provided on the Heritage
Foundation’s website: www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology. Following
this link, a complete description of all ten index components of the Heritage
Foundation’s ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ can be found. Since our work only uses
the sub-indicator ‘Labor Freedom’, we describe this component here.
The labor freedom sub-indicator is a quantitative measure that considers var-
ious aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labor market,
including regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, sev-
erance requirements, and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours
worked. Six quantitative factors are equally weighted: Ratio of minimum wage
to the average value added per worker; hindrance to hiring additional workers;
rigidity of hours; difficulty of firing redundant employees; legally mandated notice
period; mandatory severance pay.
Based on data collected in connection with the World Bank’s Doing Business
report, these factors specifically examine labor regulations that affect the hiring and
redundancy of workers and the rigidity of working hours. In constructing the labor
freedom score, each of the six factors is converted to a scale of 0 to 100. A country’s
overall labor freedom score is then simply obtained by averaging the converted
values of the six factors. Unless otherwise noted, the index relies on the following
sources for data on labor freedom, in order of priority: World Bank, Doing Business;
International Labor Organization, Statistics and Databases; World Bank, World
Development Indicators; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce; U.S.
Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide; and official government
publications of each country.
Also note that, the index value of, for instance 2014, is based on data for the
86
Appendix to Chapter 4
period covering the second half of 2012 through the first half of 2013. Therefore, in
Section 4.2, we report the index data lagged by one year to make them comparable
to the youth unemployment data provided in Figure 4.1 on page 58.
A.3.2 Family ties
The description of the data sources is based on Alesina and Giuliano (2014), who
provide the index values of family ties reported in Section 4.2. This index is based
on data of the World Values Survey (WVS) (see www.worldvaluessurvey.org for a
comprehensive description of the survey project).
The WVS is composed of national surveys on values and norms on a wide variety
of topics, carried out four times (1981–1984, 1990–1993, 1995–1997, and 1999–2004).
The questionnaires contain information on different types of attitudes, religion,
and preferences, as well as information on demographic characteristics (gender,
age, education, labor market status, income, etc.).
The strength of family ties is measured by looking at three variables from
the WVS, which capture beliefs regarding the importance of the family in the
respondent’s life, the duties and responsibilities of parents and children, and love
and respect for one’s own parents. The first question assesses how important
the family is in one person’s life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1 being
very important and 4 not important at all). The second question asks whether the
respondent agrees with one of the two statements (taking the values of 1 and 2
respectively).
• Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must
always love and respect them.
• One does not have the duty to respect and love one’s parents if they have not
earned such respect and love.
The third question prompts respondents to agree with one of the following state-
ments (again taking the values of 1 and 2 respectively).
• It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense
of their own well-being.
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• Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own
well-being for the sake of their children.
These measures are combined in two ways. First, the sum of all of them is taken
and the variables are recoded such that a higher number corresponds to stronger
family ties. Second, the first principal component is extracted from the whole data
set with all individual responses for the original variables. This approach yields
the index values of family ties we report in Section 4.2.
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